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TRANSLATING UNOCAL:
THE EXPANDING WEB OF LIABILITY FOR
BUSINESS ENTITIES IMPLICATED
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
ROBERT

C.

THOMPSON,*

ANITA RAMASASTRY,t

AND MARK B. TAYLOR-'

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, a group of villagers from Myanmar sued Unocal Corporation in the United States for alleged complicity in forced labor
and other crimes against humanity committed in Burma/Myanmar
by a military unit under contract to provide security during the
construction of a gas pipeline. The Unocal litigation produced two
milestone events in the development of human rights law: decisions by both a California federal district court' and a panel of the
[This Article contains numerous citations to "[name of country] Resp.," "[name of country] Supp. Resp.," and "[name of country] Section of Composite Supp. Resp." For more
information regarding these sources, see infra note 11.-Ed.]
* L.L.B. 1967, Harvard Law School; B.A. 1963, Harvard College. Mr. Thompson is a
retired attorney admitted in Massachusetts and California who does pro bono work for
international human rights organizations. He was formerly Associate General Counsel
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and a partner with the law firm of
LeBoeuf, Lamb Greene and MacRae, LLP (now Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP).
D. Wayne and Anne E. Gittinger Professor of Law, University of Washington
t
School of Law; J.D. 1992, Harvard Law School; B.A. 1988, Harvard College.
t Deputy Managing Director of the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies
in Oslo, Norway (Fafo); LL.M 1996, Universiteit Leiden.
The authors wish to thank Charles Abrahams, Oksana Bilobran, Joseph Breham,
Jonathan Clough, Bruno Demeyere, Llewelyn Diggs, Surya Deva, Elise Groulx, Nicola
Jagers, Elise Keppler, David Linnan, Olga Martin-Ortega, Jo Stigen, Shari Lewis Thompson, and Shimpei Yamamoto for reviewing this Article in draft and providing helpful comments. The authors also wish to thank Christian Ruge, Karen Ballentine, and John
Karlsrud for their work on the projects that laid the foundation for this Article.
1. Doe I v. Unocal Corp, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter District
Decision]. The plaintiffs were villagers from Myanmar who had been subjected to forced
labor, rape, physical injuries, torture, and murder at the hands of the military unit that was
under contract to a consortium of international energy companies. See id. at 1295. Lacking any means of redress in Myanmar, the surviving victims and the dependents of the
decedent victims filed their complaint in a federal district court in California. See id. at
1294. Also implicated in the action along with Unocal were the military junta ruling
Myanmar and Total S.A., a French company involved with the consortium that was constructing the pipeline. Id. at 1295-96. Total and Unocal were not accused of directly per-
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Ninth Circuit 2 that ruled that a corporation could be held liable
3 for its complicity
under the federal Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)
in a violation of international criminal law occurring outside the
United States.
Since the decision in Unocal, every year litigants have filed
increasing numbers of ATCA cases involving the complicity of cor4
porations in human rights abuses outside the United States.
These cases continually bring to the attention of multilateral agencies, businesses, lawyers, scholars, and human rights advocates that,
in conditions of war or political repression, host countries (that is,
the countries in which the activities in question occur) rarely provide forums in which the perpetrators of serious human rights
abuses may be held accountable. 5 Simply stated, host countries
petrating the crimes, but of complicity in those crimes because they had allegedly provided
material support to the military security force and had done nothing to restrain the abuses.
See id. at 1303. The claim against the ruling military junta in Myanmar was dismissed on
sovereign immunity grounds. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 886 (C.D. Cal.
1997). The claim against Total was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Doe I v.
Unocal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 1998). As for Unocal, the district court held
that a corporation could conceivably be liable for complicity in the crimes involved, but
granted summary judgment for Unocal on the grounds that the applicable test under
international law for complicity had not been met, because there was insufficient evidence
in the record to demonstrate Unocal's "active participation in the unlawful conduct." District Decision at 1310.
2. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). The panel decision reversed
the summary judgment on the grounds that the District Decision had applied the wrong
test for complicity. See id. at 947. The panel adopted the test used by the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda-namely, providing substantial
assistance with the knowledge that it would facilitate a crime. See infra notes 93-96 and
accompanying text. After a hearing before the full bench of the Ninth Circuit, but before
a decision, the parties settled. As a condition of the settlement, all prior decisions were
vacated. See Doe I v. Unocal, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
3. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) [hereinafter ATCA] provides
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The
statute allows foreign plaintiffs to seek civil redress in federal courts for certain violations of
international law. A companion statute, the Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2006) [hereinafter TVPA], was enacted in 1992. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, International HumanitarianLaw in the Courts of the United States: Yamashita, Filartiga, and 911, 36
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 1, 21-27 (2004) (discussing the origins of ATCA, the TVPA and
the principal court decisions interpreting those statutes). It allows suits by U.S. nationals as
well as aliens for torture or extrajudicial killings that occur abroad. Id.
4. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007); Khulumani v.
Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
5. See generally, John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819 (2007) (discussing the human rights obligations of
transnational corporations); Leiv Lunde & Mark Taylor, Regulating Business in Conflict
Zones: Challenges and Options, in PROFITING FROM PEACE, MANAGING THE RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL WAR (Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke eds., 2005) (summarizing the
dynamics involved in civil conflicts in which business entities are implicated); Olga Martin-
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with informal economies and the defacto recession of the state generally exhibit a nearly total loss of regulatory effectiveness and thus
are poor environments for regulating transnational economic entities. 6 The widespread occurrence of these conditions around the
world has been termed a global "governance gap" and a "permis7
sive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds."
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo
(IMTFE) were the first judicial efforts to close the governance gap
by trying and convicting a number of individual businessmen who,
on behalf of their employers, had engaged in aiding and abetting
forced labor and other international crimes during World War 11.8
After nearly fifty years, Unocal and the suits following in its wake
have revived those efforts by constructing a basis under U.S. law for
victims of human rights abuses occurring abroad to bring civil
actions against the offending companies themselves. 9
Ortega, Deadly Ventures? Multinational Corporationsand Paramilitariesin Colombia, 16 REviSTA
ELECTRONICA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (2008) (describing relationships between
transnational corporate business activities and the hostilities in Colombia); Robert
Dufresne, Reflections and Extrapolationon the ICJ'sApproach to Illegal ResourceExploitation in the
Armed Activities Case, 40 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 171 (2008) (describing the conditions of
widespread illicit exploitation of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that
became the subject of litigation before the International Court of Justice); Surya Deva,
Human Rights Violations By MultinationalCorporationsand InternationalLaw: Wherefrom Here?,
19 CONN.J. INT'L L. 1 (2003) (describing the role of multinational corporations in deprivations of basic human rights and the efforts of international and domestic authorities to
regulate their activities).
6. See Lunde & Taylor, supra, note 5, at 328 (describing the ineffectiveness of legal
regulators in conflict zones, as well as the frequent corruption of conflict-zone
governments).
7. U.N. Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business
and Human Rights, 1 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (preparedby John Ruggie),
See also
available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf.
HUMAN RiGHTS WATCH & CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, ON THE MARRIGHTS AT RISK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008), available at http://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr02O8-l.pdf (presenting a compendium of information regarding human rights violations by business companies that is drawn from
numerous reports prepared by Human Rights Watch).
GINS OF PROFIT:

8. See Anita Ramasastry, CorporateComplicityfrom Nuremberg to Rangoon, An Examination
ofForced Labor Cases and TheirImpact on the Liability of MultinationalCorporations,20 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 91, 104-18 (2000) (discussing the prosecution of business representatives acting
in concert with Axis armed forces in forced labor and other crimes against humanity committed in Europe and the Far East during World War II).
9. The panel decision relied on the landmark decision Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala,630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), for the proposition that federal courts could hear allegations
under the ATCA brought by aliens against those who commit human rights violations
abroad. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 969 (9th Cir. 2002).
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These cases raise two questions: (1) Is the United States the only
country that provides judicial accountability for business entities
involved in international crimes abroad? and (2) How are other
countries "translating" the basic kinds of accountability that Unocal
recognized into their own legal systems?1"
This Article attempts to answer these questions by presenting the
results of a comparative law survey (the Survey)1 involving sixteen
countries (the Surveyed Countries) 12 that invited lawyers and legal
scholars to examine questions relating to the status of international
criminal law (ICL) 13 in each country. Their responses examine the
10. The need for accountability for business entities is part of a larger search for
accountability for offenders generally. See Beth Stephens, TranslatingFilartiga;A Comparative and InternationalLaw Analysis of Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 34 (2002) (arguing that accountability for human rights abuses,
a concept native to most legal systems, "translates" differently in the legal traditions of
different countries).
11. The Survey was conducted in 2005 and 2006 by Fafo with the financial support of
the Ford Foundation and the governments of Canada, Norway, and Switzerland. The
authors of this Article were the principle researchers. The results of the Survey were originally summarized in ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, FAro, COMMERCE, CRIME
AND CONFLICT: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRvE BREACHES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (2006), available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf. The
Survey questionnaire and all responses are available at http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/CCC
index.htm (last visited June 27, 2009). References in this Article to individual responses to
the Survey appear in footnotes to this Article as: "[name of country] Resp.," or, in cases
where a supplemental response has been received, either as: "[name of country] Supp.
Resp." or "[name of country] Section of Composite Supp. Resp." The authors of this Arti-

cle owe a profound debt of gratitude to the extensive volunteer efforts of the respondents
below and peer reviewers (whose names appear in parentheses): for Argentina, TomAS
Ojea Quintana (Santiago Otamendi); for Australia, Richard Meeran (Jonathan Clough,
Sarah Joseph, Bernadette McSherry, and Justine Nolan); for Belgium, Bruno Demeyere
(Kristof Cox); for France, William Bourdon, Yann Queinnec, and Abigail Hansen; for Germany, Remo Klinger (Anthony Sebok); for India, Srinivasan Muralidhar (Surya Deva); for
Indonesia, Harkristuti Harkrisnowo and David K. Linnan; for Japan, Human Rights Now,
coordinated by Professor Yasunobu Sato and Shimpei Yamamoto; for the Netherlands,
NicolaJdgers (Menno T. Kamminga); for Norway, Ingrid Hillblom (Asne Julsrud, Gro Nystuen, Christian H. Ruge, and Mark B. Taylor); for South Africa, Charles Abrahams (Max
Du Plessis); for Spain, Ana Libertad Laliena (Olga Martin-Ortega); for Ukraine, Oksana
Bilobran (Scott Horton); for the United Kingdom, Stephen Powles, Rosanna Mesquita,
Jeremy Carver and Richard Hermer; and for the United States, Robert C. Thompson.

12. The sixteen countries are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, South Africa, Ukraine, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries were selected with the objective
of maximizing the geographic distribution of the countries as well as the differences in
their legal traditions.
13. As used in this Article, "international criminal law" (ICL) means the body of law
containing offenses against universally recognized human rights and/or other universally
protected international interests that are identified in the various international covenants
discussed in this Article. Those covenants have required or otherwise led their parties to
adopt domestic legislation penalizing such offenses, thereby incorporating ICL into their
respective penal codes. ICL is a subset of a wider body of law referred to as "international
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incorporation of ICL from the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Rome Statute and ICC, respectively) 1 4 and other
international covenants into domestic penal codes, assess the extraterritorial application of those laws, describe applicable concepts of
third-party liability, and evaluate the status of corporate liability
under domestic penal codes. Their responses reveal other sources
of criminal liability for illicit business conduct abroad, such as bribery of foreign officials, money laundering, and dealing in stolen
property. Finally, they provide analyses of the laws and legal customs relating to the rights of victims to access civil courts in the
Surveyed Countries (and the obstacles that impede such access) in
search of compensation and other remedies under various concepts of tort, delict, 1 5 and noncontractual responsibility.
This Article's summary analysis of the responses presents compelling evidence of the existence of what has been termed an
emerging transnational "web of liability"' 6 for business entities
implicated in international crimes. Since the Surveyed Countries
represent both civil and common law traditions, parties as well as
nonparties to the ICC, and a wide geographic spectrum, it is reasonable to assume that the conclusions reached in this Article may
be extrapolated more broadly to cover a far wider set of countries.
A.

InternationalCriminal Law Is Widely Incorporatedinto the
Domestic Penal Codes of the Sixteen Countries

A fundamental premise of ICL is that certain human rights are
so widely recognized in international covenants and other authorihumanitarian law." See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 Am.J.
INT'L L. 239, 243 (2000) (discussing the evolutionary development out of the "laws of war"
originally designed to codify the rules of "civilized" international warfare of a body of international law that aims to protect human rights during internal armed conflicts as well as
non-international armed conflicts).
14. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
There are 110 parties to the ICC, including twelve of the Surveyed Countries. See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/Volume%2011/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-10.en.pdf (last visited June 27, 2009).
15. A "delict" is the civil law equivalent of a tort. See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of
Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed
HagueJudgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 173 n.178, 177 (2001) (discussing
rules applicable to torts/delicts under various European authorities). See also Belgium
Resp., 44; Netherlands Resp., 23.
16. See RAmASASTRY & THOMPSON, supra note 11 at 27 ("web of liability"); U.N. Human
Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping InternationalStandards of Responsibility
and Accountability for Corporate Acts, 22, UN.Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007) (prepared
by John Ruggie) ("an expanding web of potential corporate liability for international
crimes"); Ruggie, supra, note 5, at 831 ("this expanding jurisdictional web").
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ties that violations should be punished wherever they occur. If a
host country suffers from a governance gap, and fails for whatever
reason to prosecute a violation of ICL, then that failure should be
remedied by either an international tribunal or the domestic criminal courts of other countries. Domestic courts can enforce ICL
17
only when it has been incorporated into their penal codes.
After World War II, a series of widely ratified international covenants emerged that today define and proscribe the crimes found in
ICL. The Genocide Convention (1948) defines and proscribes the
crime of genocide. 18 The four Geneva Conventions (1949)19 provide extensive definitions of war crimes pertaining to international
conflicts and carve out a selection of particularly serious war
crimes, called the "grave breaches," which are required to be
included in the penal codes of all parties.20 These "grave
breaches" include the killing or inhuman treatment of prisoners
and the compulsion of a prisoner of war to serve in one's own
17.

See infra note 33.

18. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. There are 141
parties to the Genocide Convention, including all of the Surveyed Countries except Indonesia andJapan. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%201/Chapter%20V/IV1.en.pdf (last visited July 29, 2009) (listing parties to the Convention).
19. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Convention II]; Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 2, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Convention III]; Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention IV]. The 1949 Conventions each contain a list of
certain crimes considered so important that the drafters decided to call them "grave
breaches" and to require each of the parties to adopt criminal legislation that penalized
them. See infra note 21. There are 194 parties to each Convention, including all of the
Surveyed Countries. Int'l Comm. Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
International Humanitarian Law: State Parties / Signatories, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited July 27, 2009) (listing parties to the
Conventions).
20. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, "[t]he idea of including a definition of 'grave breaches' in the actual text of the Convention came from the
experts called in by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1948. It was thought
necessary to establish what these grave breaches were, in order to be able to ensure universality of treatment in their repression. Violations of certain detailed provisions of the
Geneva Conventions might quite obviously be no more than offences of a minor or purely
disciplinary nature, and there could be no question of providing for universal measures of
repression in their case." See International Humanitarian Law - First 1949 Geneva Convention, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/365-570061?OpenDocument (last visited July 28,
2009).
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armed forces. 2 1 Article 3 in each of the 1949 Conventions (Common Article 3) contains a brief description of war crimes that are
applicable to noninternational conflicts. 22 These resemble the
grave breaches, but none is denominated a "grave breach" that parties to the 1949 Conventions are obligated to punish.
The Apartheid Convention (1973) defines and proscribes the
practice of apartheid.2 3 Additional Protocols I and 1124 to the 1949
Conventions (both 1977) contain additional war crimes, with Additional Protocol I adding to the list of war crimes, including several
new grave breaches, such as launching attacks on civilians and perfidious use of the emblems of humanitarian agencies like the Red
Cross. 25 Additional Protocol II adds extensively to the list of war
21. The four 1949 Conventions contain an aggregate total of nine "grave breaches."
See Convention I, supra note 19, art. 50 ((1) "wilful killing," (2) "torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments," (3) "wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health," and (4) "extensive destruction and appropriation of property,
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly."); Convention
I, supra note 19, art. 51 (same as Convention I); Convention III, supra note 19, art. 130
(same as Conventions I and II, except for the deletion of the last clause (4) regarding
destruction and appropriation of property, plus, in addition: (5) "compelling a prisoner of
war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power," and (6) "wilfully depriving a prisoner of war
of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention"); Convention IV, supra
note 19, art. 147 (same as Conventions I and II, plus, in addition: (7) "unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person," (8) "wilfully depriving a
protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention," and (9) "taking of hostages").
22. See Convention I, supra note 19, art. 3; Convention II, supra note 19, art. 3; Convention III, supra note 19, art. 3; Convention IV, supra note 19, art. 3.
23. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter Apartheid Convention]. There
are 107 signatories, including three of the Surveyed Countries: Argentina, India and
Ukraine. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%201/Chapter%
201V/iV-7.en.pdf (last visited June 27, 2009).
24. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
25. There are 168 parties to Additional Protocol I, including all of the Surveyed
Countries except India, Indonesia, and the United States. Int'l Comm. Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, International
Humanitarian Law: State Parties / Signatories, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?Read
Form&id=470&ps=P (last visited July 28, 2009) (listing parties to Additional Protocol I).
Additional Protocol I expanded the list of war crimes applicable to international armed
conflict. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, arts. 8-79. It also added thirteen new
"grave breaches." The new breaches dealt with: (1) medical experimentation, id. art.
11(4)(2), attacking individual civilians, id. art. 85(3)(3), indiscriminately attacking the
civilian population or civilian property, id., (4) attacking "works or installations containing
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crimes applicable to noninternational conflicts, but it does not add
to the list of grave breaches. 26 The Torture Convention (1987)
defines and proscribes torture "by or at the instigation of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity." 27 The Rome
Statute (1998) codifies almost all of the crimes from these preceding conventions and adds additional crimes, particularly, for the
first time, an extensive list of crimes against humanity. 28 Lastly, the
dangerous forces" (e.g., dams) knowing that civilians would be harmed, id., (5) attacking
nondefended and demilitarized zones, id., (6) attacking persons who are hors de combat, id.,
(7) perfidious use of the symbols of the Red Cross, Red Crescent, or Red Lion, id., (8)
transferring one's own population into occupied territory, id. art. 85(4), (9) deportation of
the population of an occupied territory, id., (11) practices of apartheid and other practices
based on racial discrimination, id., (12) attacking historical monuments, works of art, or
places of worship that are not in military use by the opposing forces, id., and (13) depriving certain persons of the right to a fair trial. Id.
26. Additional Protocol II significantly expands the protections available in noninternational conflict. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, arts. 4-17. It created no new
grave breaches, however, thus imposing no new incorporation obligations on its parties.
There are 164 parties to this Protocol, including all of the Surveyed Countries except
India, Indonesia, and the United States. A list of the parties is available at http://treaties.
un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201125/volume-1125-I-1751 3-English.pdf (last
visited July 28, 2009).
27. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention], available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39rO46.htm. There are
146 parties, including all of the Surveyed Countries except India. For a list of parties, see
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%201/Chapter%201V/
IV-9.en.pdf (last visited June 27, 2009).
28. The list of "crimes against humanity" developed over time, beginning with the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Rules in Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter], which punished "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal." See IMT Charter art. 6(c). See also Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution
of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 Am.J. INT'L L. 551, 564-65 (2006) (discussing
the legal arguments used to justify the application of "customary international law" to provide authority to the IMT to penalize crimes against humanity).
The 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity art. 1 (b), Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 [hereinafter Statutory Limitations Convention], available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/FULL/435?Open
Document, called upon its parties to eliminate statutes of limitations for violations of enumerated "crimes against humanity" that included the ones from the IMT Charter, plus (6)
"eviction by armed attack or occupation or inhuman acts resulting from apartheid" and (7)
"the crime of genocide [from the Apartheid Convention]." See Statutory Limitations Convention, art. I(b). There are 53 state parties to the Statutory Limitations Convention, but
including only three of the Surveyed Countries-Argentina, India and Ukraine. For a list
of parties, see Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume
%201/Chapter%20IV/IV-6.en.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
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Child Soldier Convention (2000) proscribes the use in combat of
children under fifteen years of age. 29 With the exceptions of Additional Protocol 1130 and the Rome Statute, 3 1 each of these covenants obligates its parties to adopt legislation that penalizes
The statutes of both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda contain identical lists of crimes against
humanity, drawn primarily from the IMT Charter, to which the Security Council resolutions establishing the new tribunals added imprisonment, torture, and rape. See Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, art. 5, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The crimes in the ICTY Statute are limited to those "committed in
armed combat." ICTY Statute art. 5. The crimes against humanity in the Statute of the
ICTR are limited to those "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population on national, ethnic, racial or political grounds." ICTR Statute art.
3.
The list of crimes against humanity in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute includes all of the
above crimes, together with "[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." Rome
Statute, supra note 14, art. 7(1) (k). These are punishable only "when committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack." Id. art. 7(1). The Statute defines "attack" in terms that could apply to acts
committed either in wartime or peacetime, so long as the acts constitute "a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts." Id. art. 7(2) (a). See generally Beth Van
Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 787 (1999) (tracing the development of a standard for crimes against
humanity that would justify international intervention in the affairs of sovereign states in a
nonconflict situation, and explaining how that standard inspired the adoption of the
"widespread and systematic" formula first appearing in Article 3 of the ICTR Statute and
ultimately in Article 7(2) (a) of the Rome Statute).
29. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc A/54/RES/263
(entered into force Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Child Soldier Convention]. There are 128
parties, including all Surveyed Countries. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, http://treaties.un.
org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%201/Chapter%2OV/IV-11-b.en.pdf
(last visited
July 29, 2009). The Child Soldier Convention proscribes the use of children younger than
18 years in armed hostilities. See Child Soldier Convention, supra, art. 1. Both Additional
Protocol I and Additional Protocol II had imposed a ban on the use of children below the
age of 15 in hostilities, but without requiring their parties to criminalize violations. See
Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 77(2); Additional Protocol II supra note 24, art.
4(3) (c)-(d). See also Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 8(2) (b) (xxvi), 8(2) (e) (vii).
30. Several of the war crimes relating to noninternational conflicts in Additional Protocol Il-for example, attacking the civilian population (Additional Protocol II, supra note
24, art. 13) and attacking historical monuments or places of worship (Additional Protocol
II, supra note 24, art. 16)-have been included in the Rome Statute (see Rome Statute, arts.
8(e) (i), (iv)), thereby becoming subject to the incentive contained in the Rome Statute for
countries to incorporate them into their penal laws, as discussed in the text corresponding
to infra notes 34-39.
31. Parties to the Rome Statute are under no explicit obligation to incorporate the
core crimes contained in the Rome Statute, although the preamble contains a clause
reminding parties that they have obligations under existing international law to do so. See
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violations of certain identified provisions.3 2 Once a country has
adopted the necessary legislation, generally as part of the ratification process, these crimes become enforceable in the country's
33
courts along with all other domestic crimes.
The Rome Statute offers its parties a strong incentive to incorporate the three core crimes3 4 of genocide,35 crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 36 The Rome Statute is founded on the
Rome Statute, supra note 24, pmbl. ("Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes . . ").
32. See Convention I, supra note 19, art. 49; Convention II, supra note 19, art. 50;
Convention 1111, supra note 19, art. 129; Convention IV, supra note 19, art. 146.
33. None of the Surveyed Countries reported that a person may be prosecuted for
conduct that is not proscribed in a penal code provision, although such a provision may
simply incorporate by reference all of the crimes in the international covenants to which a
country is a party. See Netherlands Section of Composite Supplementary Resp. Thus, the
maxim nulla crimen sine lege ("no crime without a [written] law") seems to be widely
observed at the domestic level. In contrast, international courts have applied "customary
international law," (also referred to as "the customs and usages of war"), that is, those
actions that have been so widely recognized as international crimes in writing by various
authoritative sources ("opinio juris"), and so widely banned by international legal sources
("state practice"), that they should be recognized by an international tribunal as criminal
even though they are not found in written legal instruments that specifically proscribe
them in the jurisdictions where they are committed. See Theodor Meron, The Continuing
Role of Custom in the Formation of InternationalHumanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238
(1996) (discussing the evolution of customary international law and its application by the
IMT and the ICTY).
34. The Rome Statute gives the ICCjurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but this
jurisdiction will not take effect until further action by the Assembly of States Parties under
Articles 121 and 123. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 5(2).
35. Genocide is defined as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction, in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Convention, supra note 18, art. II; ICTY Statute, supra note 27, art. 4(2); Statute
of the ICTR supra note 27, art. 3(2); Rome Statute, supra note 24, art. 6.
36. The Rome Statute contains thirty-eight war crimes applicable to international
armed conflict and a further sixteen applicable to non-international conflicts. See Rome
Statute, supra note 14, art. 8. These are drawn from multiple preexisting covenants, most
notably the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Id. art. 8(2)(a)), Additional Protocol I (for example, prohibitions on attacks against civilians, id. art. (8)(2)(b)(i), Declaration III to the
1989 Hague Convention-on the Use of Bullets Which Expand or Flatten Easily in the
Human Body (July 29, 1899) (Id. art. 8(2) (b) (xix) and the Hague Convention Respecting
the Laws of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907 (for example, pillaging a town or
place, even when taken by assault, id. art. 8(b) (2) (xvi)). Some prohibitions that neither
the 1949 Geneva Conventions (like Common Article 3) nor Additional Protocol I gave
.grave breach" status, as well as the prohibition on the conscription of children below the
age of 15, are now criminally enforceable in the ICC and in the criminal courts of any
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principles of complementarity, meaning that the enforcement of
the core crimes is expressly the primary responsibility of the
domestic courts of countries, irrespective of whether they are parties to the Statute. 3 7 Accordingly, the ICC may not investigate or
prosecute an offender for any crime that a domestic court is willingly and adequately investigating or prosecuting. 38 It is therefore
in the interests of all countries, parties and nonparties alike, to
incorporate the core crimes because this is the only way they will
have the necessary legal authority to prosecute their own nationals,
thereby avoiding the embarrassment and potential political consequences of having any offenders among their own people brought
39
before the ICC.
Given the obligations and incentives just mentioned, it is not surprising that the Survey found that ICL has been widely incorpocountry that has incorporated the core crimes from the Rome Statute. See, e.g., Rome
Statute, supra note 14, art. 8. The two lists of war crimes are not exhaustive, as the Rome
Statute gives the ICC general authority to punish "other serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in ["international conflicts" and "conflicts not of an international character"]. Rome Statute, supra note 14, arts. 8(2) (b), (e).
37. The ICC is complementary to national criminal jurisdiction in the sense that it is
not the primary source of justice over international crimes. Its jurisdiction over crimes is
effective only if a national court does not assert jurisdiction or if the national court is
"unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 17(1)(a).
38. A country seeking to defeat ICC jurisdiction may argue inadmissibility on three
grounds. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 17. All grounds require that the country,
which does not have to be a state party, have authority to punish the core crimes. See id.
The first ground applies if the country is investigating or prosecuting the person involved,
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." Id. art. 17(1) (a). The second ground applies when a state has investigated the case
and has decided not to prosecute, "unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute." Id. art. 17(1) (b). The third ground applies
when the person involved has already been convicted or acquitted by a state for the conduct that is the subject of the complaint by the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art.
20(3). The conviction or acquittal will bar an ICC trial unless the State's proceedings: (a)
"were for the purposes of shielding the person concerned from responsibility for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court;" or (b) "otherwise were not conducted independently
or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law
and conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice." Id. These provisions clearly authorize the ICC to
look beneath the surface of a domestic court's proceedings to ascertain whether they meet
the test for adequacy.
39. A country that has adopted the core crimes of the Rome Statute may or may not
also have authority to punish acts of torture by governmental officials that do not occur as
.part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population" or the
use of child soldiers below the age of 18 or apartheid that occurs in a context other than a
"widespread and systematic attack." Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 7. The country's
authority to punish these crimes would depend upon whether it had incorporated these
crimes from other relevant international covenants.
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rated by the sixteen Surveyed Countries. Twelve of the sixteen are
parties to the Rome Statute, 40 and nine of these-Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom-have already incorporated the three core crimes. 4 1 The penal codes of the remaining
4 3 India, 4 4 Indonesia,45
seven countries-Argentina, 4 2 France,
40. The twelve Surveyed Countries that are parties to the Rome Statute are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Ukraine is a signatory, but has not yet ratified the
Statute. India, Indonesia, and the United States are not signatories. See Rome Statute,
supra note 14.
41. See Australia Resp., at 7; Belgium Resp., at 21; Canada Resp., at 4; German Resp.,
at 12; Netherlands Resp., at 17; Norway Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; South Africa
Resp., at 20; Spain Resp., at 10; and U.K. Resp., at 16.
42. Argentina is a party to the Genocide Convention, supra note 18, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, supra note 19, Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, Additional Protocol II,
supra note 24, the Torture Convention, supra note 27, the Rome Statute, supra note 14, and
the Child Soldier Convention, supra note 29. It has not adopted legislation to incorporate
any of the international crimes into its penal code. See Argentina Resp., at 17. Accordingly, international crimes can only be prosecuted based on analogous crimes in the penal
code. For example, "enforced disappearance of persons" would be punished as "illegal
deprivation of liberty," "genocide" as "murder," and so forth. See id. at 17, 20. Argentina's
amnesty for crimes committed during the "dirty war" period from 1976 to 1983 was overturned in partial reliance on the Statutory Limitations Convention. See Luis Benavides,
Introductory Note to Supreme Court of Mexico: Decision on the Extradition of Ricardo Miguel
Cavallo, 42 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 884, 886 (2003). Numerous prosecutions of offenders
from the "dirty war" have resulted. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Argentine Ex-Army Chief Gets Life
Sentence in 'Dirty War' Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at A9; Alexei Barrionuevo, Argentine
PriestReceives Life Sentence in 'Dirty War' Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, at A7.
43. France is a party to the Genocide Convention, supra note 18, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, supra note 19, Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, Additional Protocol II,
supra note 24, the Torture Convention, supra note 27, the Rome Statute, supra note 14, and
the Child Soldier Convention, supra note 29. It has incorporated the crime of genocide
from the Genocide Convention into its domestic law. See France Resp., at 15. It has a brief
list of crimes derived from the Statute of the IMT that constitute both war crimes (when
committed during wartime) and crimes against humanity (whenever occurring). See id.
France has also incorporated the crime of torture from the Torture Convention. Id. at 7,
19.
44. India is a party to the Genocide Convention, supra note 18, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 19, and the Child Soldier Convention, supra note 29. It has no statute
incorporating genocide. See India Resp., at 14. It has no crimes against humanity. See id.
It has no torture statute applicable in peacetime. See id. India has signed the Torture
Convention, but had not ratified it as of February 24, 2008. See supra note 27. India has
enacted a statute, entitled the "Geneva Conventions Act of 1960," which incorporates the
grave breaches from each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. India Resp., at 21. India does
not expressly ban the use of child soldiers in its military, but its child labor laws (prohibiting the employment of children below the age of 14) may have some application. See India
Resp., at 14; India Section of Composite Resp.
45. Indonesia is a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 19, the Torture
Convention, supra note 27, and the Child Soldier Convention, supra note 29. Indonesia
has no war crimes in its penal code. Indonesia Resp., at 8.
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Japan, 4 6 Ukraine, 47 and the United States 4 8-contain many international crimes incorporated from the other covenants previously
mentioned. None of the other covenants requires its parties to
incorporate crimes against humanity or war crimes applicable to
noninternational conflicts, and accordingly there are gaps in the
penal codes of most of the remaining seven countries. It remains
to be seen whether the countries with these gaps will be
encouraged by the Rome Statute to update their penal codes as a
matter of self-interest.
The pattern and pace of the process of incorporation indicated
by the Survey suggests that ICL is already finding its way into many
more domestic penal codes than the ones discussed here. In the
meantime, acts that would be violations of ICL may be indirectly
enforced under the penal code provisions of most countries that
punish such crimes as the domestic crimes of murder, assault, child
The Indonesian parliament passed Law Number 26/2000 in November 2000. See Indonesia Resp., at 8. It provides for the establishment of a new court system to try cases of
gross human rights violations committed before the legislation was adopted, including
crimes against humanity and genocide. See Law No. 26/2000, Nov. 6, 2000., art. 7
(Indon.). Since the Indonesian Constitution forbids the retroactive application of law, it is
unclear whether this law will survive judicial scrutiny.
46. Japan is a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 19, Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, the Torture Convention, supra
note 27, the Rome Statute, supra note 14, and the Child Soldier Convention, supra note 29.
Most ICL crimes have not been incorporated into the penal code and thus ICL violations
would have to be punished as their domestic analogs, except for some crimes incorporated
in 2004, such as destruction of historic monuments (art. 3), delay in the repatriation of
prisoners of war (art. 4), transfer of its own civilian population into occupied territory (art.
5), and delay in the repatriation of civilians (art. 6). SeeJapan Resp., at 18, 21.
47. Ukraine is a party to the Genocide Convention, supra note 18, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, supra note 19, Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, Additional Protocol II,
supra note 24, the Torture Convention, supra note 27, and the Child Soldier Convention,
supra note 29. It is a signatory but not yet a party to the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute,
supra note 14. Ukraine has incorporated the crimes of genocide and official torture from
the respective conventions. Ukraine Resp., at 13, 15. It has no crimes against humanity on
its books. Id., at 14, 18; Ukraine Section of Composite Supp. Resp. Ukraine has a statute
that incorporates all of the grave breaches identified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the two Additional Protocols. Ukraine Resp., at 20, Ukraine Section of Composite Supp.
Resp. Whether the crimes would pertain to activities occurring in non-international conflicts has not yet been definitively established. Ukraine Section of Composite Supp. Resp.
48. The United States is a party to the Genocide Convention, supra note 18, the 1949
Geneva Conventions, supra note 19, the Torture Convention, supra note 27, and the Child
Soldier Convention, supra note 29. It has incorporated the crime of genocide, the crime of
official torture, all of the grave breaches from the 1949 Geneva Conventions and all of the
provisions of Common Article 3. U.S. Resp., at 12 n.28, 13. It has no crimes against
humanity on its statute books. Id. at 12. The United States adopted an amendment to its
war crimes statute in 2006 that incorporates all of the provisions of Common Article 3. See
18 U.S.C. § 2441(d) (2006).
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neglect, slavery, false imprisonment, persecution of minorities, and
torture.
B.

The ExtraterritorialReach of Domestic Laws
Creates a Universal "Web of Liability"

The ICC's core jurisdiction extends to offenses committed by the
nationals of parties, offenses committed on the territory of parties,
and offenses committed by the nationals of other countries that
have accepted the ICC's jurisdiction-or on the territory of those
countries. 49 The U.N. Security Council could expand this core
jurisdiction by referring to the ICC a situation arising in any country, as it did in the case of Darfur. 50 Alternatively, it could create an
ad hoc international tribunal, such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter. 5' Or the Security Council could establish a special
"mixed" international/domestic court, such as that created for
Sierra Leone. 52 These kinds of actions by the Security Council
should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule, since
there is a high potential for such actions to be blocked unless they
serve the interests of all of the permanent members.

49. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 12. ICCjurisdiction also extends to acts committed aboard ships and aircraft registered to its parties. See id. art. 12(2) (a).
50. Cases arising anywhere in the world may be referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 13(b). The Security Council referred the
situation in Darfur to the ICC on March 31, 2005. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1593
(March 31, 2005). That resolution referred to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter as partial
authority. See id.
51, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council to "determine
the existence of any threat to the peace ... and ... decide what measures shall be taken...

to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 39. This has
been interpreted to include the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals to
punish war crimes occurring during specific conflict situations. Acting pursuant to Chapter VII, the Security Council has adopted Resolution 827 establishing the ICTY and Resolution 955 establishing the ICTR. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993);
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
52. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created by an agreement between the
Security Council and the government of Sierra Leone. See S.C. Res 1315, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (authorizing the creation of the Special Court under Chapter
VII). It is composed of a Trial Chamber consisting of one judge appointed by the government of Sierra Leone and two judges appointed by the Secretary-General of the Upited
Nations and an Appeals Chamber consisting of two judges appointed by the government of
Sierra Leone and three judges appointed by the Security Council. See id art. 12(1).
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As of January 1, 2009, there were 192 members of the United
Nations, 53 of which 108 were parties to the Rome Statute.5 4 These
108 countries contain approximately 28 percent of the world's population. 55 The remaining 84 U.N. members have yet to join,
including seven of the world's ten most populous countries: China,
India, the United States, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the
Russian Federation. Thus, over 70 percent of the world's population (and a correspondingly high percentage of its territory) is
outside of the ICC's core jurisdiction. Also, as discussed below, the
ICC has no jurisdiction over corporations and other legal
56
persons.
Even where it has jurisdiction, the ICC, like other international
tribunals, may be expected to focus its attention on the most egregious and high-level offenders, 5 7 leaving it to domestic courts to
58
deal with other offenders.
53. United Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtmI (last visited May 12, 2009).
54. See Rome Statute, supra note 14.
55. The population of the world in 2006 is estimated to have been approximately 6.5
billion. The 108 countries that are parties to the Rome Statute then had an estimated
combined population of approximately 1.8 billion, or roughly 28 percent of the world
population. See Countries of the World (By Largest Population), http://www.worldatlas.
com/aatlas/populations/ctypopls.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2009). Spreadsheet calculations and other sources of this information are on file at the office of the George Washington
InternationalLaw Review.
56. See infra Part D.
57. The Rome Statute expressly limits the ICC's jurisdiction to "the most serious
crimes of international concern." Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 5. The policy of the
ICTY is to do the same. See Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-scale Crimes
at the InternationalLevel: The Experience of the ICTY, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUsT. 539, 542 (2006)
(discussing the limitations placed on the Prosecutor of the ICTY by the terms of Resolution
1503 of the Security Council, and the selection factors that lead the ICTY to concentrate its
efforts on the most egregious cases); Meron, supra note 28, at 563 (explaining how the lack
of resources and political backing often requires ad hoc tribunals to prosecute only the
highest level officials).
58. The IMT itself tried twenty-three high level individuals. See Major Michael A.
Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals Who Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REv. 1, 48 n.226 (1996). Military courts of the allies tried at least
an additional 21,000 lesser offenders. See id. The IMTFE at Tokyo tried twenty-eight high
level individuals. See id. Approximately 5,700 additional lesser offenders were tried in the
military courts of the allies. See Steve Sheppard, Propter Honoris Respectum: Passion and
Nation: War, Crime, and Guilt in the Individual and the Collective, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 751,
785 n. 16 (2003). The ICTY has opened slightly fewer than 100 cases, some of which
involve multiple defendants. See ICTY Indictments and Proceedings, http://www.un.org/
icty/cases-e/indictments-e.htm (last visited May 12, 2009). To date, the ICTR has completed forty-three cases; it has twenty-six cases in progress and another five awaiting trial.
See ICTR - Status of Cases, http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/status.htm (last visited
May 12, 2009).
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The Survey found that domestic courts of the Surveyed Countries generally have the requisite extraterritorial jurisdiction to
potentially fill the territorial and other gaps just mentioned-jurisdiction that extends to ICL offenses committed outside of their
borders. Fourteen of the Surveyed Countries have universal jurisdiction over ICL violations globally and can thus apply all or a part
of their ICL laws to violations irrespective of the places where they
were committed or the nationalities of the perpetrators and the
victims. 59 Having universal jurisdiction does not mean that a country may try a person in absentia, although some countries may provide for this under their domestic laws. 60 The statutes of many
other countries that apply universal jurisdiction to ICL offenses do
so subject to the offender being found in their jurisdictions.6 1
The Survey also found that all of the Surveyed Countries apply
the "active personality" principle, 62 meaning they apply their incor59. See Australia Resp., at 8; Belgium Resp., at 57; Canada Resp., at 6; France Resp., at
25; Germany Resp., at 19; India Resp., at 21; India Portion of Composite Supp. Resp.;
Japan Resp., at 19 (universal jurisdiction applies only when so required by a international
treaty to which Japan is a party); Netherlands Resp., at 21 (universal jurisdiction may be
limited to those situations where there is a treaty in force with another state giving the
Netherlands the right to prosecute); Norway Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; South
Africa Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Spain Section of Composite Supp. Resp.;
Ukraine Resp., at 26 (penal code of Ukraine authorizes prosecution of acts committed
abroad "in such cases as provided for by international treaties"); Ukraine Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; U.K. Resp., at 17, 19; U.S. Resp., at 12. Belgium's universal jurisdiction
statute was amended in 2003 to provide that, in lieu of the prior system whereby individuals could commence a constitution de partie civile, now only the federal prosecutor can investigate ICL violations committed abroad, thus limiting, although still preserving for some
purposes, the universal jurisdiction of Belgium's ICL laws. Belgian Resp., at 52.
60. A number of civil law countries authorize in absentiatrials, but the practice is confined to a minority of jurisdictions, and is not allowed in common law countries. See Belgian Resp., at 61; Claus Kress, UniversalJurisdictionover InternationalCrimes and the Institut de
Droit Internationa 4J. INr'L CRIM. JUST. 561, 577 (2006) (discussing the existence of rules
allowing in absentia proceedings in Belgium, Germany, Israel, New Zealand, and Spain and
concluding that it is allowed in a definite minority of states); Roger O'Keefe, Universal
Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735 (2004) (discussing the
varying notions of universal jurisdiction and the ways in which enforcement may occur,
depending upon the presence of the offender in the prosecuting country's territory, the
willingness of another country to extradite, and the availability of in absentia authority in
certain domestic laws); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: THE
STATE OF THE ART

28 (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/

ij0606web.pdf.
61. See Canada Resp., at 5; Netherlands Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Norway
Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; South Africa Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; U.K.
Resp., at 19 (as to war crimes); U.S. Resp. (18 U.S.C. § 2440A (2008) requires that the
offender be present in the United States before he or she can be subject to the war crimes
statute).

62. This principle is sometimes referred to as the "principle of active nationality."
Belgian Resp., at 56.
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porated ICL to conduct of their nationals abroad. 63 Furthermore,
all of the Surveyed Countries except for Argentina apply the "passive personality" or "protective principle," hence all or a part of
their incorporated ICL applies to crimes committed abroad against
64
their own nationals or involving a national interest.
One who offends ICL could, in theory, simultaneously become
liable to being prosecuted in the ICC or in any number of countries, with liability flowing from a variety of sources that take into
account the nationality of the offender, the place of the crime, and
where the offender is physically present during the course of a
criminal investigation. Thus, there is literally no place in the world
where someone can commit an international crime without incurring liability, whether under the Rome Statute or the laws of
numerous countries. An offender for whom an arrest warrant has
been issued by the ICC or one or more domestic courts faces a
kind of containment-the offender will risk being apprehended in
numerous countries and may have to live as a fugitive. 65 And even
63. See Argentina Resp., at 20 (Argentina's criminal laws are applicable to conduct
abroad by "agents or servants of Argentine authorities, in the function of their duties,"
which presumably covers the Argentine military, diplomats, and so forth, but not private
persons); Australia Resp., at 8; Belgian Resp., at 56; Canada Resp., at 4; France Resp., at 8;
Germany Resp., at 18; India Resp., at 21 (India has a special statute that applies only to war
crimes, which India can punish wherever occurring and by whomever perpetuated.); Indonesia Resp., at 14; Japan Resp., at 19, 21; Netherlands Resp., at 21; Norway Resp., at 22;
South Africa Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Spain Resp., at 13 (applicable to "crimes
committed in the exercise of their functions by Spanish public servants residing abroad");
Ukraine Resp., at 25; U.K. Resp., at 17, 19; U.S. Resp., at 12.
64. See Argentina Resp., at 20 (Argentina allows prosecution when the "effects" of a
crime are felt in Argentina.); Australia Resp., at 8; Belgium Resp., at 57 (requires double
incrimination-the act in question must be a crime in the country in which it occurred);
Belgian Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Canada Resp., at 6; France Resp., at 8; Germany
Resp., at 18; India Resp., at 21; Indonesia Resp., at 14; Japan Resp., at 15; Netherlands
Resp., at 21; Norway Resp., at 22 (requires double criminalization); South Africa Section
of Composite Supp. Resp.; Spain Resp., at 12 (requires double criminalization.); Ukraine
Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; U.K. Resp., at 17-19; U.S. Resp., at 12 (genocide and
war crimes only).
65. The Rome Statute encourages cooperation on extradition matters between the
Prosecutor of the ICC and domestic prosecutors, and among domestic prosecutors themselves. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, arts. 34-52. Parties are obligated to arrest and
surrender to the Court any person for whom a warrant has been issued by the Court. See
id., arts. 58, 89. Mutual assistance obligations, including the duty to extradite, are also
found in all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, the Genocide
Convention, and the Torture Convention. See Convention I, supra note 19, art. 49; Convention II, supra note 19, art. 50; Convention III, supra note 19, art. 129; Convention IV, supra
note 19, art. 146; Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 88; Genocide Convention, supra
note 18, art. 7; Torture Convention, supra note 27, art. 8. The Torture Convention provides the legal basis for extradition for the crime of torture, whether or not an extradition
treaty is in force between a requesting party and the party on whose territory an offender
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if the offender manages to find refuge in a country that is willing to
grant asylum (thus deliberately flouting all extradition requests),
there is never a secure existence-travel and immigration options
will be severely limited, access to funds could be cut off, and, if the
politics of the country granting asylum should change, the
offender could be surrendered to an international court, extradited to another country to face prosecution, 66 or tried by the
67
domestic courts of the country that formerly provided sanctuary.
If ultimately tried and convicted of an ICL violation, the offender
may forfeit all ill-gotten gains through restitution mechanisms such
69
68
as those included in the Statute of the ICTY, the Rome Statute,
70
and the rules of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
C. Domestic Penal Codes Providefor Third-Party Liability in the Forms
of Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting, andJoint Criminal
Enterprise/ Common Purpose
International courts have applied four principal modes of participation to punish offenders who were not the actual perpetrators
of crimes but were indirectly involved: 7 1 (1) conspiracy; (2) aiding
and abetting (complicity); (3) joint criminal enterprise; 72 and (4)
may be found. Torture Convention, supra note 27, art. 8. The conventions generally
include the obligation to either extradite or try the offenders.
66. This has already occurred in the case of Charles Taylor, the former president of
Liberia. See Marlise Simons, FormerLiberian Presidentin the Haguefor Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 2006, at A6 (discussing the transfer of Charles Taylor to the Hague to stand trial in the
Special Court for Sierra Leone).
67. This is potentially the situation for Hissene Habre, former president of Chad. See
Lydia Polgreen, African Union Tells Senegal to Try Ex-Dictator of Chad, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2006,
at A4.
68. See ICTY Statute, supra note 28, art. 24(3).
69. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 75.
70. Charles Taylor is a living example of someone who would face forfeiture of his
illicitly obtained fortune if he is ultimately convicted. See Marlise Simons, Gains Cited in
Hunt for Liberia Ex-Warlord's Fortune, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2008, at A4 (discussing the fact
that the Special Court for Sierra Leone has engaged a London law firm to search through
banking records, which could lead to funds being seized under an order of restitution and
transferred to a special trust fund established to assist victims of the wars in Liberia and
Sierra Leone, including those who were mutilated by machetes).
71. The term "corporate complicity" has been used by policymakers and scholars
involved in the ongoing debate about business and human rights to cover all situations
where businesses are implicated as accomplices in the human rights violations perpetrated
by others. See Ramasastry, supra note 8, at 92 n.4. One of the earliest instances of its broad
usage was in the U.N. Global Compact. See The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AbouttheGC/TheTENPrinciples/index.html
(last visited May 12, 2009). Principle Two of the Compact states that companies should "make
sure they are not complicit in human rights abuses." Id.
72. Also referred to as "common purpose."
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superior responsibility. 73 The Survey found that most of the
domestic penal codes in the Surveyed Countries contain these
modes of participation, resulting, not from the incorporation of
international law, but from provisions in their preexisting penal
codes.
Conspiracy in its classical formulation is a crime that occurs when
74
two or more persons enter into an agreement to commit a crime.
Depending upon variations in domestic penal codes, it is often
required that the conspirators thereafter take some concrete step
76
to carry out that agreement. 75 Conspiracy was used in the IMT
and IMTFE 77 to punish leading civilian and military participants in
the crime of planning and executing aggression. The statutes of
the ICTY and ICTR both contain the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide. 78 The Rome Statute has no conspiracy provision, an
omission that may be offset by the presence of other provisions for
third-party liability, as discussed below. The Survey found that the
penal codes of twelve Surveyed Countries contain conspiracy
provisions.

79

Aiding and abetting(complicity) in its classical formulation allows a
court to convict a person who facilitates the commission of a crime
by providing assistance to the actual perpetrator of that crime (the
"aiding" part of complicity) or who orders, urges, or instigates
another to commit a crime ("abetting").80 Aiding and abetting was
73. Also referred to as "command responsibility."
74. See generally Anne Langer and Jonathan Parnes, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 45 Am.
CRIM. L. REv. 449 (2008) (discussing the elements of the offense of conspiracy under U.S.
law, including recent examples of criminal prosecutions for conspiracy).
75. See, e.g., U. S. Resp., at 9.
76. Article 5(a) of the IMT Charter, supra note 28, punishes "the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law,
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing." (emphasis added)
77. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5(a), Apr.
26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1587, availableat http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFEA5.html [hereinafter IMFTE Charter].
78. See ICTY Statute, supra note 28, art. 4(3) (b); ICTR Statute, supra note, 28 art.
2(3) (b).
79. See Australia Resp., at 5; Belgium Resp., at 17; Belgium Supp. Resp., at 93; Canada
Resp., at 3; France Resp., at 13; India Resp., at 13; India Section of Composite Supp. Resp.;
Japan Resp., at 12, 14; Netherlands Resp., at 14; South Africa Resp., at 16; Spain Resp., at 9;
Ukraine Resp., at 9-12, Ukraine Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; U.K. Resp., at 13 ("The
agreement in question must involve either spoken or written words or be evidenced by a
course of conduct."); U.S. Resp., at 9 ("One or more persons [must] do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy.").
80. See Ramasastry, supra note 8, at 141-43 (discussing the historical development of
the concepts of aiding and abetting applied in international criminal tribunals).
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used by the IMT.81 It is being used by the ICTY8 2 and ICTR.8 3 It is
also included in the Rome Statute.8 4 In general, the elements of
aiding and abetting are: (a) that a crime or attempted crime be
committed; (b) that the accomplice provided assistance to the perpetrator (the actus reus); and (c) that the accomplice had the requisite mental state (mens rea).8 5 The test for the actus reus applied by
the ICTY and ICTR is that the assistance given by an accomplice
86
must have a "substantial effect on the commission of the crime."
At the risk of oversimplification, there are three main tests used
in criminal law to determine whether a party had the requisite mens
rea to be convicted for aiding and abetting a crime. The "intent"
test8 7 is met where an accomplice desires the same outcome as a
perpetrator (that is, that the crime be committed), s88 In other
words, the accomplice must have possessed a willingness that the
crime result. A lower threshold is found in the "knowledge" test,8 9
which requires only that the accomplice knew or should have
known (given all information available to him) that his actions
could assist in the commission of a crime; the accomplice, however,
does not need to have shared the intent or desired the outcome. 90
The knowledge test allows a court to convict a person even if he
81. See The Zyklon B Case (Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others), 1 Law Reports of
Trials of War Criminals 93, 93-102 (1997) (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946). The owner of the firm that
supplied Zyklon B gas to the SS for use in the extermination camps was convicted of complicity in war crimes and sentenced to death. See United States v. Karl Krauch, 8 Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law 10
(1950). Officials in the I.G. Farben company were convicted of complicity in war crimes
and crimes against humanity for their role in the construction of extermination camps. See
generally United States v. Flick, 6 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law 10 (1949).
82. See ICTY Statute, supra note 28, art. 7(1).
83. See ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 6(1).
84. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 25(a)(3).
85. See generally Ramasastry, supra note 8, at 143.
86. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 48 (July 29, 2004)
("The Appeals Chamber reiterates that one of the requirements of the actus reus of aiding
and abetting is that the support of the aider and abettor has a substantial effect upon the
perpetration of the crime. In this regard, it agrees with the Trial Chamber that proof of a
cause-effect relationship between the conduct of the aider and abettor and the commission
of the crime, or proof that such conduct served as a condition precedent to the commission of the crime, is not required.").
87. Variously referred to as the "specific intent" test or the "shared intent" test.
88. See U.S. Supp. Resp., at 2.
89. See Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32,Judgment, 102(ii) (Feb. 25, 2004)
("In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the
acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of the specific crime of the
principal.").
90. See id.; U.S. Supp. Resp., at 3.
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actively wished that the crime not be committed. 9 1 A third standard, referred to as the dolus eventualis test, relates to situations
where an accomplice is aware of the risk that the perpetrator might
commit a crime but nonetheless consciously decides to provide
92
assistance.
For businesses, the issue of intent is critical because in many circumstances, the officers and managers of a company, either individually or collectively, may not share the same intent as the
perpetrator of an ICL violation. It is more likely that they knew or
had reason to know that their actions were facilitating the crime, or
that they were aware of a serious risk of such a crime being
committed.
The IMT, the ICTY, and the ICTR generally applied the knowledge test for mens rea.93 However, there is now a potential divergence of approach between the ICC and its predecessor tribunals.
Article 25(1) (c) of the Rome Statute provides that one is guilty of
aiding and abetting a crime if "[fl or the purpose of facilitating the
commission of such a crime, [one] aids, abets or otherwise assists
in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission." 94 The "for the purpose of facilitating" language has been interpreted in one of the few court
decisions that have considered it as requiring not just knowledge,
but the intent to commit a crime.9 5 If the ICC ultimately adopts a
91. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-964-T, Judgment, 539 (Sept. 2, 1998)
("As a result, anyone who knowing of another's criminal purpose voluntarily aids him or
her in it, can be convicted of complicity even though he regretted the outcome of the
offence.").
92. See Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of CorporateComplicity in Human Rights
Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 339, 343, 346 (2001) (discussing the nature of
dolus eventualis as applied in international law).
93. See Ramasastry, supra note 8, at 143.
94. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 25(1)(c).
95. See Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). Two
judges in separate opinions stated that the appropriate formulation for aiding and abetting
liability in an ATCA case is not the knowledge test applied by the pre-ICC tribunals, but the
test in the Rome Statute, with its "for the purpose" language. See id. at 274-75 (Katzmann,
J., concurring); id. at 332-33 (Korman,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Korman stated: "'This means more than the mere knowledge that the accomplice aids the
commission of the offence, as would suffice for complicity according to the ICTR and ICTY
Statutes, rather he must know as well as wish that his assistance shall facilitate the commission of the crime.'" Id. at 332-33. (quoting Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in

I

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 767,

801 (Antonio Cassese et

al., eds. 2002)) (emphasis added). The third judge, Judge Hall, would apply the knowledge standard found in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, for instance, the common law
test for civil liability. See id. at 287-89 (Hall, J., concurring). It should be noted that the
Panel Decision in Unocal did not discuss the Rome Statute's definition of complicity. See
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000). A federal district
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similar interpretation, it would represent a departure from the test
96
used by the prior tribunals.
The Report of the International Commission of Jurists Expert
Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes 9 7 has
suggested that, at least in some cases, the question of whether the
Rome Statute contains an "intent" test or a "knowledge" test may
not make a practical difference.98 The Commission reasons that if
the Statute is interpreted to contain an "intent" test, the way in
which an offender's mental state is determined (that is, by examining all relevant circumstances) could lead a court to conclude that
a person who has knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal intent
and yet proceeds to provide the assistance could be found to have
acted with intent (that is, with the purpose of facilitating the
crime).99 It will, of course, be up to the ICC to interpret its own
statute. Yet, irrespective of whether the Rome Statute complicity
provision contains a test akin to the intent test or the knowledge
test, there still will remain some inconsistency between the ICC and
a number of domestic jurisdictions.
The Survey found that aiding and abetting concepts are present
in the penal codes of all of the Surveyed Countries, 0 0 albeit with
court has recently ruled that the "intent" test implicit in the "for the purpose" clause contained in the Rome Statute may be satisfied by reference to Article 30(2) of the Statute,
which defines "intent" to mean either actual intent or "[i] n relation to a consequence, that
person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary
course of events." In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 262 (S.D.N.Y.
2009). This interpretation would seem to align the Rome Statute's mens rea test with the
"knowledge" test used by the ICTY and the ICTR. See id.
96. See Doug Cassell, CorporateAiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion
in the Courts, 6 Nw. U.J. INr'L HuM. RTs. 304, 310-12 (2008) (discussing the drafting history
of the Rome Statute leading to the inclusion of the "for the purpose" language, and also
raising the question of whether the purpose in question need be a sole purpose, or
whether a secondary purpose might suffice, for instance, to assist the perpetrator in continuing their criminal activities so as to secure an ongoing profitable business position).
97. The International Commission ofJurists (ICJ) is a nongovernmental organization
with 85 national sections headquartered in Geneva. See 2 INT'L COMM'N OFJURISTS, REPORT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COM-

unnumbered page). Its mission is to promote the understanding of the rule of law and the protection of human rights around the
world. See id. In March 2006 the ICJ asked eight expertjurists to serve on an Expert Legal
Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes, charged with exploring when business entities could become liable as accomplices in international crimes. Id. at vii. The
final report in 2008 reflected consultations with a large number of concerned individuals
and nongovernmental organizations. See id.
98. Id. at 22.
99. Id.
100. See Argentine Resp., at 5, 12; Australia Resp., at 5; Belgium Resp., at 16; Canada
Resp., at 2, 3; France Resp., at 10, 11; Germany Resp., at 1; India Resp., at 7, 13; Indonesia
Resp., at 6, 7; Japan Resp., at 11, 13; Netherlands Resp., at 12; Norway Resp., at 7; South
PLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2008) (third
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nuanced differences among them-as well as many similarities. 1 0 '
There was agreement among the Surveyed Countries on a variety
of issues. For example, the countries agree that assistance may be
given either verbally or by concrete action. 10 2 Additionally, they
agree that assistance given after the commission is viewed as a separate crime, which includes covering up the crime or serving as an
accessory after the fact. 10 3 Generally, the perpetrator need not be
charged with or convicted of a crime in order for the court to try
10 4
the accomplice.
There is some difference in approach toward an act of omission
as the actus reus. Generally, the omission to perform a duty will
suffice, such as the omission of a night watchman to lock up,
thereby allowing his accomplice to enter the premises.10 5 In
France and Argentina, the breach of duty may consist of a failure
to use reasonable means to prevent a crime.' 0 6 A few countries
require that the crime that was actually committed is the same one
for which the accomplice rendered assistance; others require only
that it must be of the same general type, that it was foreseeable, or
07
that the perpetrator's intent was indefinite.
Africa Resp., at 15; Spain Resp., at 8; Ukraine Resp., at 9, 10; U.K. Resp., at 10, 19; U.S.
Resp., at 7.
101. The reader who would like more detailed information regarding the various differences among the Surveyed Countries is invited to examine the individual Survey
Responses, each of which deal with the subject of aiding and abetting in a discrete section.
102. See Argentina Supp. Resp., at 3; Germany Resp., at 2; Japan Supp. Resp., at 7;
Netherlands Supp. Resp., at 3; Norway Resp., at 7; South Africa Supp. Resp., at 3; Spain
Resp., at 9; U.S. Supp. Resp., at 7.
103. See Argentina Supp. Resp., at 1; Belgium Supp. Resp., at 88, 89; France Resp., at
12; Netherlands Resp., at 12; South Africa Supp. Resp., at. 6; U.S. Supp. Resp., at 8.
104. See Argentina Supp. Resp., p. 4. Australia Resp, p. 5; Belgian Resp., p. 17; France
Resp., pp. 11, 29 (explaining, however, that where the crime was committed abroad and
acts of complicity occurred in France, a proceeding in a French court against an accomplice must present proof that the principal was convicted abroad); Germany Resp., p. 12;
Netherlands Supp. Resp., p. 4; South Africa Resp., p. 15; Spain Resp., p. 8; U.S. Supp.
Resp., at 8.
105. See Argentina Supp. Resp., at 3; Belgium Resp., at 18; France Resp., at 12; France
Supp. Resp., at 5; Germany Supp. Resp., at 2; Japan Supp. Resp., at 6 ; Netherlands Supp.
Resp., at 3; South Africa Supp. Resp., at 3; U.S. Supp. Resp., at 8.
106. See Argentina Supp. Resp., at 3; France Supp. Resp., at 5.
107. Although Germany requires that the offense that was completed must have been
the one that the accomplice sought to assist, Germany Resp., at 12, most of the other
countries require only that the offense that is ultimately attempted or completed be of the
same kind, or the perpetrator's intention was indefinite as to the exact type of crime. See
Belgium Suppl. Resp., at 100; France Supp. Resp., at 1; U.K. Resp., at 12; and U.S. Supp.
Resp., at 8. In Japan, the principal must have committed the crime that the accomplice
foresaw or a lesser crime of the same general nature (for example murder was foreseeable,
but only bodily injury occurred, so the accomplice is charged with bodily injury). SeeJapan
Supp. Resp., at 2.
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The countries differ regarding other aspects of aiding and abetting. For example, some countries require that the actus reus be
indispensable to the commission of the crime, whereas others
require that it be "substantial."' 0 8 Still others require that it merely
contribute in some manner to the crime. Some countries require
the crime to have been completed; 10 9 others require only an
attempted crime. 110 Some countries punish complicity the same as
the underlying crime;"' others reduce the penalty for
accomplices.

112

On the key issue of what constitutes the mens rea of aiding and
abetting, the Survey found a lack of unanimity among the Surveyed
Countries. Thirteen employ a test comparable to the "intent"
test,1 1 3 with three of these countries (Germany, the Netherlands,
and South Africa) also employing a version of the dolus eventualis
test.11 4 Three Surveyed Countries (Argentina, Japan, and Norway)
apply a "knowledge" test, 1 5 and each also applies a version of the
108. The laws of Belgium require that the crime "could not have been committed without their assistance." Belgium Resp., at 17. Most of the other countries' penal codes, however, provide that the assistance must only make a contribution in some degree to the
criminal act, without being a "substantial" contribution. See Argentina Supp. Resp., at 1
("secondary complicity"); Australia Resp., at 5; France Resp., at 11 ("material participation");Japan Supp. Resp., at 9 (mere "facilitation"); Netherlands Supp. Resp., at 3; Norway
Section of Comp. Supp. Resp., at 10; South Africa Resp., at 4, South Africa Suppl. Resp., at
15 (explaining, however, that some courts seem to require a "substantial" or "causal"
impact on the crime); Ukraine Resp., at 10 ("a causal connection"); U.S. Supp. Resp., at 1.
109. See Australia Resp., at 5; Belgium Resp., at 20; Germany Supp. Resp., at 2; South
Africa Resp., at 15; U.K. Resp., at 12.
110. See Argentina Supp. Resp., at 3; Australia Resp., at 5; France Supp. Resp., at 7;
Netherlands Resp., at 13; Norway Resp., at 7; South Africa Supp. Resp., at 6; U.S. Supp.
Resp., at 6. India is reported to punish assistance, even though the perpetrator does not
go so far as to be liable for an "attempted" crime. See India Resp., at 13. Germany would
punish even an attempt to assist a perpetrator even if there is no ultimate unlawful act by
the perpetrator. See Germany Supp. Resp., at 2.
111. See France Resp., at 10; Germany Supp. Resp., at 2.
112. See Argentina Resp., at 12 (one-third to one-half reduction for assistance that was
not indispensable to the commission of the crime, for instance "secondary complicity");
Belgian Resp., at 17; Indonesia Resp., at 7 (one-third reduction of sentence); Japan Resp.,
at 13; Netherlands Resp., at 12 (one-third reduction); and Spain Resp., at 9 ("the accomplices to a consummated or intended crime shall be punished with penalty one degree
lower than that established for the perpetrator of the same crime.").
113. See Australia Resp., at 5; Belgium Supp. Resp., at 85; Canada Resp., at 3; France
Resp., at 12; Germany Resp., at 12; India Resp., at 13; Indonesia Resp., at 7; Netherlands
Supp. Resp., at 1; South Africa Resp., at 16; Spain Section of Composite Supp. Resp.;
Ukraine Resp., at 10; U.K. Resp., at 12; U.S. Supp. Resp., at 4.
114. See Germany Supp. Resp., at 1;Japan Supp. Resp., at 4; Netherlands Supp. Resp.,
at 1.
115. See Argentina Supp. Resp., at 2; Japan Supp. Resp., at 2; Norway Section of Composite Supp. Resp.
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dolus eventualis test. 116 In both common law and civil law jurisdic-

tions, the state of mind of the accomplice may be inferred from the
state of the defendant's knowledge and surrounding circumstances.11 7 Thus, it is not necessary for the prosecution to produce
an admission or other direct evidence of the actual thoughts occurring inside the defendant's head.
There is an argument that the test for mens rea used to judge
international crimes should be uniform, whether applied in international or domestic courts."1 8 After all, should not international
crimes always be tried using the same substantive law, irrespective
of the nature or location of the court involved? In recognition of
this principle, the Dutch court in the Van Anraat matter1 19 (which
could have selected either the "knowledge" test under international law or the dolus eventualis test available under Dutch law)
120
ultimately decided to apply the international "knowledge" test.
Van Anraat was acquitted of complicity in Saddam Hussein's use of
gas in his genocidal war against the Kurdish people because the
prosecution failed to prove that he knew of Iraq's genocidal intentions.1 2 ' One writer has questioned the legal advisability of this
116. See Argentina Supp. Resp., at 2; Japan Supp. Resp., at 4; and Norway Section of
Composite Supp. Resp.
117. See France Supp. Resp., at 1; U.S. Supp. Resp., at 3-6.)
118. Cf Andre Nollkaemper, Litigation Against MNCs: Public InternationalLaw in the
Netherlands, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,

265, 280 (Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000) (discussing generally the
application of public international law in transnational litigation); Nicola M.C.P. Jagers &
Marie-Jos6 van der Heijden, CorporateHuman Rights Violations: The Feasibilityof Civil Recourse
in the Netherlands, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833, 854 (2008) (discussing an argument advanced
by Professor Nollkaemper to the effect that international standards, agreed to by all, would
be more neutral and fair). This argument is strengthened by pointing out that a domestic
jurisdiction is not fully complementary with the ICC unless it applies complicity as extensively as the Rome Statute.
6.4,
119. Van Anraat, Rechtsbank [Rb.] Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague],
23 december 2005, LJN AU8685 (Neth.).
120. See id.
121. See Harmen G. van der Wilt, Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v.
DomesticJurisdiction:Reflections on the Van Anraat Case, 4J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 239, 250 (2006)
(discussing the choice that the District Court of the Hague had between the application of
the international "knowledge" standard and the domestic dolus eventualis standard, and
suggesting that "the outcome on the complicity to commit genocide count might have
been different if the court had resorted to domestic criminal law"). The Court of Appeal
evidently disagreed with the required use of the international "knowledge" test, but upheld
the acquittal on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to convict even if the dolus
eventualis test were applied. See Harmen van der Wilt, Genocide v. War Crimes in the Van
Anraat Appeal 6J. INT'L CRiM.JUST. 557 (2008). The Supreme Court of Holland affirmed
van Anraat's conviction in 2009. See Int'l Justice Desk, Dutch Supreme Court upholds van
Anraat judgment, June 30, 2009, http://www.rnw.nl/intjustice/article/dutch-supremecourt-upholds-van-anraat-judgement.
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choice and suggested that had the court applied the dolus eventualis
test, which only requires awareness of a risk, it could have con12 2
victed Van Anraat for complicity in genocide.
Those in favor of using the test that is generally applied in a
domestic forum to try international crimes argue that international
crimes that have been incorporated into domestic penal codes
must thereafter be considered to be domestic crimes and thus
judged using the standards prevailing in the forum. 123 This argument is particularly strong when a case involves related but purely
domestic crimes as well as international crimes, as use of a single
standard to judge both categories may simplify the proceedings.
Domestic courts and legislatures will eventually sort out the mens
rea issue on a case-by-case basis. In the meantime, the business
community may have justification to complain that there are no
clear operational guidelines for them to follow in projecting
whether a particular business arrangement in any given country
amounts to criminal aiding and abetting.
Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is the term applied to the mode of
participation providing that individuals who associate themselves
with others in a plan to commit crimes should be liable for all
crimes committed by all of the other members of the group who
act according to the common plan. 124 An early precedent is the
case in the U.S. war crimes tribunal involving the leading German
industrialist Friedrich Flick, who was convicted as an accessory to
the crimes committed by the SS because of his financial contributions to that organization.1 25 The court ruled that: "One who
knowingly by his influence and money contributes to the support
thereof must, under settled legal principals, be deemed to be, if
not a principal, certainly an accessory to such crimes."1 26 The
ICTY, relying upon customary international law as found in the
prior decisions of the IMT, has applied this principle to partici-

122.

See Van der Wilt, supra, note 121.

123. See id.
124. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations:Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International CriminalLaw, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 75, 103 (2005) (discussing the evolution of the concepts of JCE and superior
responsibility within the ICTY and expressing concern that JCE in its latest formulation
could amount to "guilt by association").
125. See United States v. Flick, 6 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law 10, 1217, 1220, 1222-23 (1949).
126.

Id. at 1217.
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pants in the crimes involved in ethnic cleansing cases such as
128
Tadic127 and Brdanin.
The Brdanin court articulated a three-tiered test for the mens rea
for participating in aJCE. The defendant's mental state must meet
any one of three tests. The first requires that "the accused must
both intend the commission of the crime and intend to participate
in a common plan aimed at its commission."1 29 The second
requires that "the accused must be shown to have personal knowledge of an organized criminal system and intend to further the
criminal purpose of the system."1 30 The third requires that "the
accused can only be held responsible for a crime outside the common purpose if, under the circumstances of the case, it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or other
members of the group and the accused willingly took that risk (dolus
31
eventualis)."'
Brdanin also ruled that the participants need not have agreed
among themselves, so long as they acted according to the plan.
Moreover, it ruled that all participants could be held liable not
only for all crimes that they themselves committed pursuant to the
JCE, but also for all crimes committed by those who were hired by
other plan participants. 132 These sweeping interpretations of JCE
have been criticized in the academic press as offensive to the legality principle by coming close to "guilt by association."133 The
majority in Brdanin defended its formulation of JCE by emphasizing that a court could hold an individual liable only if that individual is found to have had criminal intent and is also found to have
made a substantial contribution to the overall criminal plan. 13 4
The court observed that disparities among the degrees of contribu127. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (July 15, 1999).
128. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment (Apr. 3, 2007). The
Brdanin court's description ofJCE was an advisory opinion, because Brdanin's crimes were
not through participation in aJCE, but for aiding and abetting. See id.
503, 504. JCE
has been applied in a number of other cases by the ICTY. One example is Prosecutor v.
Radic, Case No. IT-98-30/1, Judgment (Feb. 28, 2005), in which theJCE involved was the
infamous Omarska Camp, where inmates were subjected to horrendous living conditions
and persecution. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: A TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

FOR THE FORMERYUGOSLAVIA 370 (2006) (providing a helpful compendium of the decisions

of the ICTY through the end of 2005, including applications ofJCE to obtain a conviction).
129. Brdanin,Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, 365.
130. Id.
131.

Id. (emphasis in original).

132.
133.
134.

See id.
Danner & Martinez, supra note 124, at 124.
See Brdanin,Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment,

1

426-31.
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tion to the overall criminal enterprise by individual actors could be
35
addressed at the sentencing phase.'
The Rome Statute has codified JCE as a mode of participation.
Article 25(3) (d) makes an individual member liable for crimes
committed "by a group of persons acting with a common purpose"
when that individual's "contribution shall be intentional" and is
either "made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or
criminal purpose of the group" or "made in the knowledge of the
intention of the group to commit the crime." 136 This formulation
seems to track two of the tests for the mens rea required for participation in a JCE found in Brdanin, but not the third (that is, the
dolus eventualis test). The the drafting stage of the Rome Statute
had concluded prior to the ICTY's decisions in Tadic and
Brdanin.137 It remains to be seen whether the ICC may find a way
to adopt the third category through an application of its inherent
authority to apply customary international law. It is also possible
that the Assembly of States Parties1 38 will choose to include the
dolus eventualis test by a future amendment to the Rome Statute.
Although not invited to address JCE specifically, respondents
from five countries reported the presence of elements of this mode
of participation. Australia, India, South Africa, Ukraine, and the
United States all have laws that provide that persons who engage in
group criminal activity become liable for all of the crimes of that
group that are committed with their participation or are within the

135.

See id. 1 432.

136. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 25(3) (d). Note that the ICC is currently relying
on the theory of "co-perpetration," based on Article 25(3) (a) of the Rome Statute (making
an individual liable for crime committed 'Jointly with another or through another person"). See id. art. 25(3) (a); see also Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo
Chui, (No.: ICC-01/04-01/07) Decision on the confirmation of charges, (Pre-Trial Chamber I), Sept. 30, 2008. The Prosecutor claimed in the Katanga matter that a defendant is
guilty of an offense when he or she makes an "essential contribution" to the perpetration
of that offense through his or her 'joint control" over the individual or organization that
actually commits the offense. Katanga, 1 473. The Pre-Trial Chamber stated: "Co-perpetration based on joint control over the crime involves the division of essential tasks between
two or more persons, acting in a concerted manner, for the purposes of committing that
crime." Id. 1 521.
137. The Appeals Court issued the above-referenced Tadic decision in 1999, supra note
127, and its Brdanin decision in 2007, supra note 128. The Rome Statute was opened for
signature on July 17, 1998. See Rome Statute, supra note 14.
138. Article 112 of the Rome Statute provides for an Assembly of States Parties, which is
comprised of all states that have ratified the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note
14, art. 112. Article 121 of the Rome Statute provides that the Assembly of States Parties
has authority to amend the Rome Statute by at least a two-thirds majority. See id. art. 121.
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common design or purpose.1 39 Additionally, three countriesthat association
Argentina, the Netherlands, and Spain-reported
1 40
crime.
separate
a
is
organization
criminal
a
with
For those multinational business corporations that engage in
commercial activity involving a chain of commerce linked to a conflict or a repressive regime, the potential use of the knowledge test
or the dolus eventualis test to judge either aiding and abetting or
participation in a JCE has worrisome implications. A defense that
could otherwise be used in a jurisdiction employing only the intent
test for determining culpability-that the intent of the business was
to make money, not to commit or facilitate crimes-would be far
less likely to prevail.
It is likely that there will be cases arising in domestic courts that
will provide further guidance on when business actors have crossed
the line between innocent 'just doing business" and criminal liability. But predicting precisely how a court will come out in any individual case is not a simple matter, which results in further
uncertainty for business executives who are attempting to guide
their corporations' operations. The International Commission of
Jurists has made an admirable contribution by providing both real
and hypothetical examples to guide corporate executives,14 1 but
the line, from the businessperson's perspective, remains indistinct.
Superior responsibility is the fourth mode of participation mentioned at the outset of this section. It was first formulated in Article 85(4) of Additional Protocol I, which provides that a superior
(military) officer may be held liable for war crimes committed by
his subordinates if he knew or should have known that they had
committed or were about to commit the crimes, yet the superior
officer did nothing to punish or prevent the crimes.1 4 2 This formulation, changed so as to apply to both civilian and military hierarchies, has been carried forward into the Statutes of the ICTY and
139. See Australia Section of Composite Supp. Resp. ("In Australia, common purpose is
found in s.11.2(3)(b) Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The defendant must have intended to
aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence, and have been reckless as to
the offence actually committed."); India Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; South Africa
Resp., at 17 (almost exclusively applied to the crime of murder); Ukraine Resp., at 11 (a
crime committed by an organizer or a member of a "criminal organization" organized for
the purpose of committing crimes shall be liable for all crimes committed with their participation); U.S. Supp. Resp., at 7-9.
140. See Argentina Resp., at 15. ("unlawful association for criminal purposes"); Netherlands Resp., at 13 ("participating in an organization that has the objective to commit
crimes"); Spain Resp., at 6 ("illicit association").
141. See generally INr'L COMM'N OFJURIsTS, supra note 97.
142. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 85(4).
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the ICTR 143 as well as the Rome Statute. 144 Its presence in ICL has
obvious implications for business executives in a chain of responsibility that reaches the activities of subordinates who are active in
situations in which international crimes are occurring. Although
the Survey did not specifically request information as to the presence of superior responsibility provisions in the laws of the Surveyed Countries, several peer reviewers provided information on
their respective countries that indicated that the superior responsibility concept is applicable in Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan,
45
Norway, and Ukraine.
It is important to note that a country whose laws do not provide
for all three of the modes of participation contained in the Rome
Statute could face the problem of seeing one of its nationals prosecuted in the ICC because it lacked the necessary authority to prosecute that person for the specific mode of activity that is connected
to an ICL violation.
D. Domestic Laws Often Apply to Corporations
and Other Legal Persons
All of the international criminal tribunals from the IMT to the
ICC have had jurisdiction over crimes committed by individual
offenders, but none has had jurisdiction to punish offenses committed by legal persons such as corporations. 146 Where companies
were involved in ICL violations, the IMT and the IMTFE dealt with
those crimes by prosecuting the responsible individual company
representatives. For example, the IMT prosecuted Alfried Krupp
and other executives of Friedrich Krupp A.G., the huge munitions
company that engaged in forced labor and plunder of occupied
countries during World War II.147 The IMTFE prosecuted individ143. See ICTY Statute, supra note 28, art. 7(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 6(3).
144. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 28(b).
145. See Australia Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Canada Section of Composite
Supp. Resp.; Indonesia Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Japan Section of Composite
Supp. Resp.; Norway Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Ukraine Section of Composite
Supp. Resp.
146. See IMT Charter, supra note 28, art. 5 ("The following acts, or any of them, are
crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility."); IMTFE Charter, supra note 77, art. 5 (tracking the language of the IMT
Charter); ICTY Statute, supra note 28, art. 6. ("The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute."); ICTY
Statute, supra note 28, art. 5 (tracking the language of the ICTY Statute); Rome Statute,
supra note 14, art. 25(1) ("The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant
to this Statute.").
147. See Ramasastry, supra note 8, at 108-12 (discussing the prosecution of corporate
officials for forced labor and other international crimes committed during World War II).
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ual Japanese businessmen for their roles in forced labor and other
148
ICL violations.
During the drafting stage of the Rome Statute some of the parties to the negotiations attempted, unsuccessfully, to expand international criminal liability to legal persons, but the negotiations ran
out of time before the negotiators could reach agreement on the
issue. 149 The failure to include legal persons in the Rome Statute
creates a major gap in the ICC's core jurisdiction.
The Prosecutor of the ICC has called attention to the role that
business interests play in modern conflict situations. Luis MorenoOcampo, noting the serious ICL violations occurring in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, stated:
According to information received, crimes reportedly committed in Ituri appear to be directly linked to the control of
resource extraction sites. Those who direct mining operations,
sell diamonds or gold extracted in these conditions, launder the
dirty money or provide weapons could also be authors
of the
15-0
crimes, even if they are based in other countries.
This signals that the ICC may also pursue individual business
representatives.
The Survey found that eight of the Surveyed Countries-Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, Norway, and
the United Kingdom-make it a general practice to recognize no
distinction between natural and legal persons, thus giving ICL a
wider reach at the domestic level. 15 1 In general, criminal liability
attaches when company representatives, that is, officers, directors,
employees or agents, commit crimes while acting within the scope
of their employment or in ways that permit the courts to attribute
their activities to the company itself.
Although legal persons face no express liability for ICL violations
in the remaining eight Surveyed Countries, three of those coun148. See id. at 113-17.
149. See Cassell, supra note 96, at 315-16. See also Andrew Clapham, The Question of
JurisdictionUnder InternationalCriminal Law Over Legal Persons: Lessonsfrom the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 139-95 (Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
150. Luis MORENO-OCAMPO, SECOND ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC 4
(2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C073586C-7D46-4CBE-B9010672908E8639/143656/LMO_20030908_En.pdf.
151. See Australia Resp., at 3, 44; Belgium Resp., at 8, 13, 38; Canada Resp., at 2;
Canada Section of Composite Supp. Resp. ("The Criminal Code defines 'person' to
include legal persons, and the Canadian ICL statute adopts this definition by reference.");
France Resp., at 4; India Resp., at 5, 9, 16; Netherlands Resp., at 10, 18; Norway Resp., at 3,
5; U.K. Resp., at 3, 7, 24.
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tries-Japan, South Africa, and the United States-generally hold
legal persons liable for crimes other than ICL violations, suggesting
that legal persons may be made liable in the future. 52 In two
countries, Argentina 153 and Indonesia, 154 the prevailing legal theory holds that legal persons may not be criminally liable; in practice, however, the legislature in each country has enacted a
number of criminal laws made expressly applicable to legal persons. These involve such crimes as violating pollution-control laws,
banking laws, and antiterrorism laws. 155 Only three of the Surveyed Countries-Germany, 15 6 Spain, 1 57 and Ukraine 158-strictly
adhere to the principle that legal persons cannot commit crimes.
But even in Germany and Spain, the principle has eroded somewhat: Germany has a statute that provides for legal persons to be
held financially liable for administrative fines imposed on their
representatives;1 59 and Spain has a statute that makes legal persons
160
liable for criminal fines imposed upon their representatives.
Prosecutors in countries where legal persons are subject to ICL
may name companies as defendants along with the responsible
company representatives. This could lead to substantial fines for
the companies, as well as long-term monitoring of their activities. 161 Elsewhere, prosecution of responsible individual representatives may serve some, but not all, of the same deterrent purposes
152. SeeJapan Resp., at 6, 21;Japan Section of Composite Supp. Resp. (noting that in
Japan the question of whether to include legal persons is a statute-by-statute matter,
approximately two-thirds of the criminal statutes include provisions expressly applicable to
legal persons, but ICL is not among them); South Africa Resp., at 11, 20 (noting that legal
persons are ordinarily subject to criminal liability for crimes, but the ICL statute, which
implements an international standard, applies only to natural persons); U.S. Resp., at 4, 13
(noting that most criminal statutes other than the ICL statutes apply to both natural and
legal persons).
153. See Argentina Resp., at 3.
154. See Indonesia Resp., at 3.
155. See Argentina Resp., at 4; Indonesia Resp., at 4.
156. See Germany Resp., at 8.
157. See Spain Resp., at 4.
158. See Ukraine Resp., at 6.
159. Germany Resp., at 8.
160. See Spain Resp., at 5; Spain Section of Composite Supp. Resp. (observing that
Spanish law makes corporations civilly liable for the crimes committed by their
representatives).
161. In many circumstances, corporations can be put under monitoring as a condition
of deferred or non-prosecution agreements with the U.S. government. On March 10,
2008, the U.S. Department ofJustice released new internal guidelines governing the selection and use of monitors in deferred and non-prosecution agreements with corporations.
See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud//docs/dag-030708.pdf. Initially used only in the context
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as prosecutions of the corporations themselves. For example,
many companies have indemnification agreements with their principal officers, which means that legal costs and some penalties
incurred by individual defendants will ultimately be paid by the
corporations involved.1 62 Additionally, a company that is associated with an egregious ICL violation may face being tried "in the
court of public opinion."1 63 There can be a great deal of adverse
publicity surrounding a criminal trial of a corporation's employees
that could result in substantial adverse effects on a corporation's
reputation and business.
E.

Reaching Parent and Subsidiary Corporations

A key issue arising in the discussion of corporate complicity in
international crimes relates to situations where the offending business entity in a foreign (host) country is only a subsidiary or affiliate, but its parent is a multinational enterprise domiciled or
headquartered elsewhere (in a home country).1 6 4 The subsidiary is
a separate legal entity and may be subject to prosecution or a civil
suit only in the host country. 165 The key problem, of course, is that
the host state may be unwilling or unable to provide justice to victims or may itself be the perpetrator of the crime. In these circumstances, the focus shifts to the potential liability of the parent
corporation in the courts of the home state.
The Survey sought information regarding the legal and practical
problems associated with holding parent corporations accountable
for the acts of their foreign subsidiaries. Laws that provide for
"piercing the corporate veil," so as to hold parents civilly or criminally accountable for the acts of a subsidiary, are found in multiple
jurisdictions. Even so, there also appears to be a deeply rooted
of charges against an individual, prosecutors have increasingly relied upon such pre-trial
diversion agreements to resolve corporate criminal investigations. See id.
162. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, Martin Gelter, Hwa-Jin Kim, Richard Nolan &
Mathias Siems, Legal Liability ofDirectors and Company Officials Part 2: Court Procedures,Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 (2008) (discussing indemnification laws of twelve
countries with respect to the liability of corporate directors).
163. Ruggie, supra note 5, at 833.
164. SeeJonathan Clough, Punishing the Parent: Corporate Criminal Complicity in Human
Rights Abuses, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 899 (2008) (discussing the current state of the law
relative to parent/subsidiary liability issues).
165. For a recent example of how the use of multiple corporations can insulate a corporation in a home state, see Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453
F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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respect for corporate forms, 1 6 6 and courts apply the doctrine reluctantly. 16 7 Some countries do not even recognize the doctrine or
apply the doctrine in cases of crimes or torts.1 68 Where the doctrine applies, it generally requires that the parent must be proven
to be the "effective manager" of the subsidiary,1 69 or has "imposed
17 1
its own decisions," 170 that the corporate form is a "mere fagade,"'
172
or that "the corporate identity was used to perpetrate a fraud."
Independently of the "piercing" approach, a parent may in some
instances be reached directly for actions it has taken in connection
with the operations of the subsidiary, such as for conspiracy to
73
commit a crime or for complicity in the crimes of the subsidiary.
This was done in the recent case involving Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, a company charged with violations of U.S. and foreign laws
relating to bribery of foreign officials. 174 This approach has been
referred to as "foreign direct liability."1 75 The concept of foreign
direct liability has been applied in the context of civil lawsuits,
where the parent itself, not the subsidiary, is alleged to have made
decisions that have caused the harm. Jurisdictional problems also
arise when attempting to reach a corporate subsidiary that is not
domiciled or headquartered in the home country. 1 7 6 A doctrine
166. See South Africa Resp., at 27.
167. See Argentina Resp., at 23; Australia Resp., at 11; Belgium Resp., at 77; India
Resp., at 20; Japan Resp., at 31; Netherlands Resp., at 24; Spain Resp., at 14, 15; and
Ukraine Resp., at 27.
168. See Belgium Resp., at 77.
169. Australia Resp., at 11.
170. Belgium Resp., at 77.
171. SeeJapan Resp., at 31; Spain Resp., at 14.
172. South Africa Resp., at 27.
173. See France Resp., at 13, 22.
174. The German electronics firm Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Siemens), along with
three of its subsidiaries, pleaded guilty to charges related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA), for a range of activities, including attempted bribery of government officials
worldwide. See Siri Schubert and T. Christian Miller, Where Bribery Was just a Line Item, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21 2008, at BUL. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a
settled enforcement action on December 12, 2008 in the federal District Court for the
District of Columbia charging Siemens with violations of the anti-bribery, books and
records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Siemens AG, SEC Litigation Release No. 20,829 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm. In the largest amount a company has ever
paid to resolve corruption-related charges, Siemens offered to pay $350 million in disgorgement to the SEC as well as a $450 million criminal fine to the U. S. Department of
Justice and a fine of C395 million (approximately $569 million) to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Munich, Germany. Siemens previously paid a fine of C201 million
(approximately $285 million) to the Munich Prosecutor in October 2007. See id.
175. See Australia Resp., at 11; France Resp., at 5; Netherlands Resp., at 25.
176. See Argentina Resp., at 23, 23; Australia Resp., at 11; Belgium Resp., at 72; Japan
Resp., at 30; Netherlands Resp., at 23; South Africa Resp., at 27.
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used in Japan could allow workers in a foreign subsidiary to sue a
parent in Japanese courts for a breach of its "obligation of security," that is, the duty to ensure the health of its workers, even for77
eign workers employed by a foreign subsidiary.'
F.

Conventional Crimes Are Frequently Related to ICL Violations

ICL violations generally occur in an atmosphere of lawlessness
that encourages criminal elements to commit any number of other
crimes as well.1 78 These domestic crimes fall outside the jurisdiction of international tribunals, and thus they can be punished only
in domestic courts. Host countries on whose territory these crimes
occur have the primary enforcement responsibility, but that
responsibility is abdicated where a governance gap exists and
authorities are unwilling or unable to act. This is especially likely if
the authorities themselves are complicit in the crimes. Offenders
in countries where a governance gap exists need not fear prosecution because the court systems are either nonexistent or politically
79
dependent.
Those countries with functioning court systems whose nationals
commit conventional crimes in foreign jurisdictions may have
extraterritorial jurisdiction to punish them. This is often true, for
example, in cases of bribery of foreign officials, dealing in or
importing stolen property, and money laundering. These crimes
are seemingly endemic to the stream of commerce that supports all
sides in a conflict situation and often arise in connection with
repressive regimes.
Bribery offoreign officials. Not surprisingly, participants in an illicit
chain of commerce often resort to bribery to secure a place in the
chain. 180 Bribing a foreign official to obtain a business advantage
177.

Japan Resp., at 32.

178.

See OPEN SOCIETYJUSTICE INITIATIVE, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR THE REsOURCE CURSE

60

(2005), available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2/fs/?file_id=16376; LErV
LUNDE AND MARK TAYLOR, FAFo, COMMERCE OR CRIME 16 (2003), available at http://www.
fafo.no/pub/rapp/424/424.pdf; see generallyTHE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARMED CONFLIcr:
BEYOND GREED AND GRIEVANCE (Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman eds., 2003).
179. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 183, 196 (2002) ("American companies can participate
in or aid human rights abuses in other countries confident that the host governments will
not enforce local laws. Often, the host governments themselves are participants in the
abuses. This frames the reality of the global economy.").
180. See The Secretary-General, FinalReport of the Panelof Experts on the IllegalExploitation
of NaturalResources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 105, delivered to the Security Counci4 U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter UN. Congo

Report].
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has been a domestic crime in the United States since the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)18 1 in 1977. The
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S.
Department of Justice jointly enforce the FCPA. These agencies
have obtained numerous settlements involving multinational corporations whose securities are registered with the SEC.'8 2 Environmental and human rights advocates, governments, and the courts
have increasingly scrutinized extractive industry practices, such as
18 3
signature bonuses awarded to public officials.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Bribery Convention)' 8 4 has stimulated many other countries to enact similar
legislation. There are today thirty-eight parties to the Bribery Convention, all of whom are reported by the OECD to have adopted
legislation making bribery of foreign officials illegal for their
nationals. 8 5 This includes thirteen of the Surveyed Countries, with
India, Indonesia, and Ukraine being the only nonparties. South
Africa, although not a party to the Bribery Convention, criminalizes bribery of foreign officials.18 6 India and Indonesia (the latter
already having some antibribery laws in place18 7) are under consideration for membership in the OECD, which could lead them to
adopt any necessary additional legislation. Domestic bribery statutes with extraterritorial application have great potential to

181. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l (2006).
182. See Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L.
REv. 1447, 1449-50 (2008) (discussing recent proceedings against multinational corporations under the FCPA); SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN FCPA
ENFORCEMENT 8 (2008), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/LITFCPA
Trends_12l208.pdf.
183.

See, e.g., Jeff Gerth, U.S. Businessman Is Accused Of Oil Bribes to Kazakhstan, N.Y.
Apr. 1, 2003, at Al0 (describing the prosecution of James Giffin under the Foreign
Corrupt Practice Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006)).
184. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 112 Stat. 3302, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
185. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, http://
www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en-2649-37447-2027102_1_1_1_37447,00.html
(last
visited July 20, 2009) (describing of all of the implementing legislation adopted by parties
to the Convention). See Ratification Status as of March 2009, available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf (last visited July 31, 2009).
TIMES,

186.
187.

See South Africa Resp., at 27.
See Indonesia Section of Composite Supp. Resp.
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ensnare business actors that bribe their way into the channel of
88
commerce in countries where ICL violations are occurring.
It remains to be seen what impact the 2005 U.N. Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC)18 9 will have with respect to prosecution of bribery and related corruption offenses. UNCAC requires
countries to establish criminal and other offenses to penalize a
wide range of acts of corruption if these are not already crimes
under domestic law. 190 UNCAC goes beyond previous instruments
of this kind, criminalizing not only basic forms of corruption such
as bribery' 9 1 and the embezzlement of public funds, 192 but also
trading in influence' 9 3 and the concealment and laundering of the
proceeds of corruption. 194 Offenses committed in support of corruption, including money laundering 95 and obstructing justice, 19 6
are to be penalized as well. UNCAC also deals with the problematic areas of private-sector corruption. Its parties are required to
adopt legislation allowing private parties to bring legal proceedings
1 97
against those responsible for their damages.
Dealing in or importing stolen property. In a conflict situation, both
sides may finance their operations by seizing and selling whatever
natural resources are available.1 98 Timber illegally harvested in
Cambodia and sold in Thailand provided the primary source of
financing for the Khmer Rouge. 199 The trade in diamonds and
timber sustained the horrendous wars in Liberia and Sierra

188. See Carter Dougherty, Ex-Manager Tells of Bribery at Siemens, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2008, at C4 (reporting on the case of the Siemens senior executives who were charged with
the bribery of foreign officials in a number of countries).
189. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 14, 2005, 2349 U.N.T.S. 145
[hereinafter UNCAC]. To date, there are 140 signatories and 135 parties to UNCAC. See
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/VolumeII/ChapterXVIII/XVIII-14.en.pdf. All of the Surveyed Countries are signatories and all but Germany, India, Japan, and Ukraine have ratified the UNCAC. See id.
190. See UNCAC, supra note 189, art. 13.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. art. 15.
Id. art. 17.
Id. art. 18.
Id. arts. 23-24.
Id. arts. 14, 23-24.
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 35.
See U.N. Congo Report, supra note 180,
141.
See GLOBAL WITNESS & FAFO, THE LoGs oF WAR: THE TIMBER TRADE AND ARMED
CONFLICT 55 (2002), available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/379/379.pdf (last visited
June 30, 2009).
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Leone. 200 In these and many similar cases, lack of enforcement of
existing statutes and regulations by the host countries or neighboring countries allowed the resources to cross international boundaries with impunity. Illegal resource exploitation during a conflict
may involve an international crime. For example, the Rome Statute penalizes "seizing the property of an adversary unless such ...
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict."20 1 But the same activities may involve domestic crimes, such
as theft, 20 2 fraud, or violation of local resource management regulations. 203 The illicit means used to acquire the natural resources
may fall within an expansive definition of "stolen" found in domestic stolen property laws that prohibit the importation of "stolen
property." 20 4 This allows a home country with a stolen-property
statute to penalize those engaged in a chain of commerce that
brings property acquired abroad by questionable means into its
markets. Those who deal in natural resources, either as brokers,
transporters, or importers, knowing of their illicit origin, could be
guilty both of complicity in such international crimes and of
directly perpetrating such domestic crimes. 20 5 The Survey
responses reported the existence of stolen-property laws in several
countries. 20 6 Since the protection of property is fundamental to
any legal system, it would be a safe assumption that most other
domestic penal codes criminalize dealing in stolen resources,
including their importation.

200.

See IAN SMILLIE, DIRTY DIAMONDS: ARMED CONFLICT AND THE TRADE IN ROUGH
13, 17 (2002), available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/377/377.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009).
DIAMONDS

201. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 8(e)(xii). See also Robert Dufresne, Reflections
and Extrapolationon the ICJ's Approach to Illegal ResourceExploitation in the Armed Activities Case,
40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 171 (2008) (discussing the interplay between "the phenomenon of the resource curse" and international law).
202. See U.N. Congo Report, supra note 180,
47-50.
203. See GLOBAL WITNESS & FARo, supra note 199, at 14.
204. See, e.g., National Stolen Properties Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006) (requiring a the
payment of a fine from any individual who "transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate
or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of
$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.").
205. See, e.g., Belgian Resp., at 29 (any property obtained as the result of any crime fits
the definition of "stolen," including property resulting from crimes committed abroad);
Netherlands Resp., at 14. The Netherlands imposes a "reasonable knowledge" test, which
implies that anyone importing items such as diamonds from a war zone might reasonably
conclude that they could be stolen property.
206. See Belgian Resp., at 29; France Resp., at 27; Netherlands Resp., at 14; U.S. Resp.,
at 13.
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Money laundering. The proceeds of criminal activity abroad are
often laundered through banks or legitimate businesses. 207 Moneylaundering statutes prohibit depositing the proceeds of criminal
activity in a bank, investing in real estate, or otherwise introducing
it into the commercial financial stream. 20 8 They also require banks
and other institutions that deal in money to inform themselves of
the source of deposited funds and to send written notification to
banking regulatory authorities whenever the bank has reason to
suspect that such funds have been derived from an illegal activity. 20 9 There is a high level of interest in money laundering in the
international community, which has led to the creation of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), established by the OECD.
The FATF is today composed of thirty-eight countries and territories, including thirteen of the Surveyed Countries. 21 0 The FATF
examines the legal authorities and operating programs involving
money laundering in all countries of the world and places any
country that does not meet strict standards on a list of Noncooperating Countries and Territories (NCCT List). Of the fortyseven jurisdictions reviewed by the FATF since 1999 for deficiencies
in their anti-money-laundering programs, none remains on the
NCCT List.2 1 1 Thus, an offender who attempts to launder the proceeds of criminal activity abroad faces a worldwide array of modern
anti-money-laundering programs that include stiff criminal
212
penalties.
See U.N. Congo Report, supra note 180,
51.
See Caroline Bradley, Private InternationalLaw-Makingfor the FinancialMarkets, 29
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 127 (2005) (discussing the structure and functioning of U.S. money
laundering laws).
209. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2009).
210. Only India, Indonesia, and Ukraine are non-members. See OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of March 2009, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf
(last visited April 15, 2009). India has observer status. Id.
211. See Financial Action Task Force (FATF), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,
en_32250379_32236992 1 1ljl,00.html (last visited April 15, 2009).
212. SeeJONATHAN M. WINER, FAFo, ILLICIT FINANCE AND GLOBAL CONFLICT 7-8 (2002),
available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/380/380.pdf (discussing the prevalence of
illicit financial practices, including money laundering, in the chain of commerce associated with modern conflicts). One recent example of the application of anti-money laundering laws in action is the case of Riggs Bank in Washington, D.C., which was ultimately
fined $25 million by the U.S. Department ofJustice for violations of U.S. anti money-laundering laws arising out of its role in laundering funds for General Augusto Pinochet. See
207.
208.

MINORITY STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 108TH CONG., MONEY
LAUNDERING AND FOREIGN CORRUPTION: ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PATRIOT
ACT: CASE STUDY INVOLVING RjGGs BANK 7, 17-37 (2004). Also, in February 2005, the bank

agreed to pay $8 million to Pinochet victims in connection with allegations that the bank
had concealed and illegally facilitated the movement of Pinochet money out of Britain. See
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The campaign against terrorism has generated domestic penal
legislation in the United States and elsewhere that has broad extraterritorial reach.2 1 3 The United States has exercised its extraterritorial authority to indict foreign arms dealers who allegedly
conspired to sell arms to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) in Colombia 2' 4 and has fined a large multinational agricultural company for paying protection money to both
sides in the Colombia civil conflict. 2 15 The United States has also
been actively exercising its extraterritorial jurisdiction over members of foreign drug rings who bring illegal narcotics into the
2 16
United States.
Numerous other crimes, running the gamut of criminality, have
been reported by panels of experts appointed by the U.N. Security
Council. 217 In one report alone, dealing with the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the experts pointed to instances of widespread smuggling of arms and other goods (especially natural
resources), customs and tax evasion, foreign-exchange violations,
counterfeiting, mass-scale looting by armed groups, monopolistic
practices, price fixing, sanctions violations, embezzlement, and corAnita Ramasastry, Stopping Banks from Hiding Human Rights Abusers' Money: A Recent Settlement by Riggs Bank Highlights the Issue, FINDLAw, Apr. 4, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.
com/ramasastry/20050404.html. See also CLARIN - Informaci6n sobre el procesamiento
de Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, http://www.elclarin.cl/fpa/pinochet.html (last visitedJan. 9,
2009) (providing documents relating to the Pinochet/Riggs investigation and prosecution,
including the original and amended complaints).
213. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(e) (2006) (granting extraterritorial authority over acts
of terrorism). A LEXIS search for the word "terrorism" used in the U.S. Code Services
produces 806 hits, including 176 hits under Title 18, the U.S. penal code (last searched
Aug. 18, 2009).
214. See David Johnston & Seth Mydans, Russian Held and Charged With Trying to Sell
Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008, at A6 (discussing the arrest in Thailand of Viktor Bout, who
was arrested in Thailand by Thai police after being indicted in the United States for an
alleged conspiracy to sell arms to the Revolutionary Armed forces of Columbia a rebel
force known as FARC); Benjamin Weiser, 2 Convicted of Scheme to Sell Arms to Terrorists,N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at A28 (discussing the conviction of Monzer al-Kassar, who was convicted of money laundering, and conspiring to provide material aid to terrorists [the FARC
in Colombia] and to kill Americans).
215. See Chiquita Settles Case on Payments to Rebel Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at
C13.
216. See Simon Romero, Colombia Extradites 14 ParamilitaryLeaders to the United States,
N.Y. TiMES, May 14, 2008, atA6 (reporting on the extradition from Colombia to the United
States of fourteen right-wing paramilitary leaders who were indicted in the United States
on drug-trafficking charges, and noting that some of the extradited men were also accused
of human rights violations in Colombia).
217. The Security Council has adopted the practice of appointing panels of experts to
survey and report on various threats to international security. This is done by a formal
resolution, such as S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000), which appointed
a panel of experts concerning Sierra Leone.
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ruption. 2 1 8

The Survey did not examine the extent to which these
crimes, if committed overseas by a national of one of the Surveyed
Countries, could be punished under the penal codes of the Surveyed Countries.
When an existing government is replaced, and the new government manages to overcome a preexisting governance gap, the
authorities may decide to bring prior offenders to justice for
crimes related to ICL violations. Such is the case in Chile, where
the financial improprieties of the former Pinochet regime are
being uncovered, leading to prosecution of crimes committed
21 9
under that regime.
A domestic prosecutor who undertakes to prosecute crimes committed abroad may choose to pursue ICL violations alone or else
join them with counts alleging conventional crimes as well. The
latter course would lead to an increased likelihood of obtaining a
conviction.
G.

Trends Are Emerging in the Domestic Prosecution of
ICL Violations and Related Crimes

Within the past few years, domestic prosecutors have undertaken
some notable domestic prosecutions of violations of ICL and
related laws. These include the cases of Hissene Habr6, the former
president of Chad, 2 20 Augusto Pinochet, the late former president
of Chile, 221 Alberto Fujimori, the former president of Peru, 222 and
Saddam Hussein, the late former president of Iraq. 223 Other noteworthy investigations and prosecutions have occurred in Argentina, Australia, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the
United States. 2 24 This small but growing collection of prosecutions
indicates that the web of liability for international crimes is already
effectively at work. These cases set important precedents and, as
they are highly publicized, create a certain deterrent effect.
218. See generally U.N. Congo Report, supra note 180,
19, 21, 47-51.
219. See Pascale Bonnefoy & Alexei Barrionuevo, Chilean Court OrdersArrests of Pinochet's
Kin and Close Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A5.
220. See An African Pinochet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A30; Marlise Simons, Belgium
Indicts Chad's Ex-Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A8.
221. See Pinochet Faces Torture and Murder Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2006, at A7.
222. See Simon Romero, Peru'sEx-President Convicted of Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2009, at A6.
223. See Neil MacFarquhar, Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence
and Fear, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at A10.
224. See infra Appendix B.
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The Survey revealed that in eight of the Surveyed Countries, the
decision to investigate and prosecute a crime is entirely in the
hands of prosecutors who are given complete enforcement discretion, with little or no official participation by victims or their representatives. Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Indonesia,
2 25
South Africa, and the United States all employ such a system.
On the other hand, the Survey also revealed that in six of the Surveyed Countries for which information was received, there are
mechanisms for individuals or organizations to initiate and/or participate in criminal proceedings. In Argentina, the victim or the
victim's representative, or even a nongovernmental organization
(NGO), may participate in charging decisions, with the right to
appeal a decision not to prosecute.2 26 In Germany, Spain, and
Ukraine, the law requires prosecutors to investigate every complaint of a crime, and prosecutors may close an investigation only if
they determine that there is no basis for a crime, although the victim or a representative may appeal a nonprosecution decision to a
higher administrative level or to a court. 227 In Germany, the attorney general may invoke a variety of grounds to justify nonprosecution of a foreign crime. 228 In Japan, the prosecutor's decision not
to prosecute is subject to the right of the victim or other complaining party to a "prosecution inquest committee" composed of
eleven members selected by lot from among registered voters. 2 29
In the Netherlands, an interested party may appeal the prosecutor's decision to a court.23 0 In addition, four of the Surveyed
Countries-Argentina, Belgium, France, and Spain-allow private
persons to initiate criminal proceedings through the action civile
mechanism. 23 1 Under this mechanism, individual victims of crimes
may initiate a criminal investigation by filing the appropriate docu225. See Australian Resp., at 13; Belgium Resp., at 86-93; Canada Section of Composite
Supp. Resp.; France Resp., at 30; India Resp., at 23, 24; Indonesian Resp., at 16; Norway
Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; South African Resp., at 37-39; U.S. Resp., at 32.
226. Argentina Resp., at 26.
227. See Germany Resp., at 27; Spain Resp., at 17; and Ukraine Resp., at 30.
228. Germany Resp., at 15 (discussing a lawsuit filed by German citizens against the
U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and other high-ranking public officials for
abuses in the Abu Ghraib prison, in which the German attorney general refused to initiate
investigation proceedings, stating that the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of another state took precedence over Germany's obligations to assist in international prosecution of ICL offenders).
229. Japan Resp., at 42.
230. Netherlands Resp., at 27.
231. See Argentina Resp., at 19; Belgium Resp., at 50; Belgium Section of Composite
Supp. Resp.; France Resp., at 22; Spain Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Stephens, supra
note 10, at 19.
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ments in court. 232 Ajudge must then conduct an investigation and
order the prosecution of the offender if justified by the evidence. 233 The victim may participate in the trial and may assert a
23 4
claim for damages in the event of a conviction.
A decision to undertake the prosecution of a crime committed
in a foreign country, where all of the victims are foreigners, would
undoubtedly present financial and other difficulties for many
national prosecutors. Such a prosecution would almost always be
far more resource-consuming and time-consuming than a purely
domestic prosecution. In a case involving crimes committed
abroad, one must gather evidence in a foreign country, obtain
extradition of foreign fugitives, and ultimately try a case that
involves foreign witnesses who speak languages that require incourt interpreters, documents in foreign languages that require
translation, and complex and unfamiliar legal issues. 2 35 For a prosecutor without sufficient resources even to prosecute all serious
domestic crimes, having to deal with complex crimes involving
events that occurred thousands of miles away, where all of the victims are foreigners, is unlikely to be a high priority. A domestic
prosecutor may decline to undertake prosecution of an international crime out of fear that neglecting local crimes could subject
the prosecutor to censure by superiors and/or adverse publicity.
Further, even where a case involving foreign events is prosecuted,
there is the overarching potential that a judge will invoke one of
many grounds to dismiss the case, such as the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of a foreign state, the "political
question" doctrine, lack of a "nexus" with the home country, and
the like. Finally, if a prosecutor is pressured by whatever source to
take on an ICL case involving foreign events, the prosecutor
should first ensure that there are sufficient resources to handle the
case to the prosecutor's best level. Otherwise, a loss could set back
not only the cause of human rights, but also the prosecutor's
career.
Nonetheless, the fact that a growing number of national prosecutors seem willing to undertake the burden of charging international crimes is evidence that there are instances when expending
232. See Stephens, supra note 10, at 19 (providing an excellent explanation of the action
civile mechanism for those unfamiliar with civil law).
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See generally HuaAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 60 (describing in detail the obstacles to justice that prevent the utilization of universal jurisdiction in many European
countries).
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precious extra resources is justified. Some of the factors taken into
account are: How egregious was the offense? Is there public pressure to prosecute? Is the accused a national of the home country?
Is the accused in the country or residing abroad? Is the accused a
prominent figure? Will the prosecution aid a foreign policy goal of
the home country? Is prosecution of the particular offense positively required by an international treaty? 236 Will civil-society organizations materially support the prosecution by providing evidence
and other assistance?
Human rights organizations in many countries have played an
important role in working to bring about prosecutions of ICL violations through their own investigative work, their public campaigns
for justice, and their effective demands that countries live up to
their treaty obligations to prosecute crimes over which they have
jurisdiction. 23 7 The case for action becomes even more compelling
when crimes impinge on other significant domestic interests, such
as the need to impede drug trafficking and terrorist activities.
The existence of the ICC may make a difference in the willingness of domestic prosecutors to undertake prosecutions of ICL vio236. SeeJagers & van der Heijden, supra note 118, at 865 (discussing how the presence
of mandatory "prosecute or extradite" language in the Torture Convention may explain
why prosecutions in Europe have focused on torture cases).
237. An excellent example is the success of Global Witness in spurring prosecutors and
government authorities to pursue Charles Taylor and his business associate, Gus van
Kouwenhoven. See GLOBAL WITNESS, TAYLOR MADE (2000), available at http://www.global
witness.org/media libraryget.php/160/1242927741/taylormade2.pdf (depicting Taylor's
use of profits from exploitative logging to fund Liberia's civil war and to instigate armed
conflict in neighboring Sierra Leone). See GLOBAL WITNEsS, A TIME FOR JUSTICE (2005),
available at http://www.globalwitness.org/media-library-get.php/235/1242928125/A%20
Time%20for%20Justice.pdf (2005) (explaining reasons for the international community
to facilitate Taylor's extradition to the Special Court for Sierra Leone). See GLOBAL WITNESS, TIMBER, TAYLOR, SOLDIER, SPY (2005), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/
medialibrary.get.php/237/1242928170/TimberTaylorSoldierSpy.pdf
(detailing how
Liberia's uncontrolled resource exploitation, Taylor's manipulation, and the re-recruitment of ex-combatants threatened regional peace). Taylor was arrested on March 29,
2006, and transferred to the Hague to stand trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone
on June 30, 2006. Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/Prosecutorvs
CharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). He faces an indictment
containing eleven charges. See Amended Indictment, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No, SCSL-2003-01-I, available at http://www.sc-sl.
org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VlfMuLYvYs4=&tabid=159. Global Witness had documented
van Kouwenhoven's role alongside that of Taylor in the Liberian conflict-exporting Liberian timber and bringing Taylor's despotic regime millions of dollars in profits. See Press
Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor, Freetown, Prosecutor
Welcomes New Global Witness Report: Charles Taylor Interference in Liberian Affairs
Remains a Threat to Peace (June 17, 2005), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.
aspx?fileticket=tCMd7rhYamU%3d&tabid=196; Marlise Simons, The Dutch Try One of Their
Own Over Links to Liberia, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at A3.
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lations. As stated earlier, the imminent prospect of an ICC
prosecution of a country's nationals could cause domestic authorities to undertake the prosecution in order to forestall the ICC's
jurisdiction in the matter. 23 8 In addition, the prosecutor of the
ICC is engaged in cooperative working relationships with domestic
investigators and prosecutors and with INTERPOL, exchanging
experiences and practice. 239 This should enhance domestic prosecutors' awareness of ICL violations and the techniques for enforcement. Additionally, the ICC prosecutor, in lieu of undertaking an
ICC prosecution, has the option of providing evidence of crimes to
domestic authorities for their follow-up action. The ICC has not
yet developed an extensive track record, and thus it remains to be
seen just how far the ICC's prosecutor needs go in order to make
the threat of international prosecution seem credible to domestic
2 40
authorities.
H.

Civil Liability for ICL Violations Is Found
in Domestic Jurisprudence

Victims of international crimes have few avenues to obtain restitution for resulting injuries and loss of property. The ICC may
order defendants to pay "fines and forfeitures" 24 1 into a trust fund
for victims, "including restitution, rehabilitation and compensation." 24 2 The Sierra Leone Special Court has similar authority.243
At the domestic level, criminal courts in many countries may order
criminal defendants to pay restitution to victims. 244 The Survey
238. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
239. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Fifteenth Diplomatic Briefing of
the International Criminal Court 9 (April 7, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/1 E5F488B-2FA9-40F4-9378-A386AF6CBA6E/280246/CompilationofStatements_15_DS.pdf.
240. To date, the prosecutor of the ICC has investigated four situations: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Darfur. See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/
Office+of+the+Prosecutor (last visited July 30, 2009). The Prosecutor is also currently
undertaking preliminary investigations in Chad, Kenya, Afghanistan, Georgia, Colombia,
and Palestine. Id. As of this writing, approximately a dozen arrest warrants have been
issued by the ICC in connection with those situations, and two cases are in the trial stage.
For the complete docket of outstanding matters, see ICC - Presidency Decisions, http://
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Presidency/Decisions
(last visited
July 30, 2009)

241. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 79.
242. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 75.
243. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 19, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
145.
244. SeeJulie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TUL. L. Rv.
167 (2004) (discussing the functioning of programs for compensating victims of crime
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found that Argentina, Belgium, France, Japan, the Netherlands,
and Spain 245 have the mixed civil/criminal mechanism of action
civile that allows a crime victim or his representative to seek damages against a defendant in a criminal case. 24 6 This mechanism,
however, has drawbacks. The international courts, like domestic
courts, are unlikely to deal with more than a few defendants. Additionally, one can expect only a very limited number of individual
criminal defendants to have substantial personal assets available for
247
restitution awards.
The lack of jurisdiction in international courts and some
national courts over deep-pocket corporate offenders compounds
the problem. Domestic prosecution of ICL violations is a vital part
of achieving justice and accountability. But the Survey results indicate that domestic prosecutors face many severe challenges. Thus,
it is important to examine whether a role exists for civil courts in
helping to close the accountability gap.
As noted above, official prosecutors and presiding judges may be
reluctant to commence investigations into remote events. In a civil
lawsuit, however, the victims themselves can take charge and commence the proceedings, provided that the courts will entertain
such suits. The Survey sought information on whether civil torts
actions (called "noncontractual liability" or "delicts" in civil law
jurisdictions) have the potential to become a viable means for victims to seek redress.
An ICL violation that results in personal injury or loss of property is likely to be factually indistinguishable from an ordinary
used in courts in the United States); Susanne Walther, Victims' Rights in the German Court
System, 19 FED. SENT'G. R. 113 (2006) (discussing how German criminal courts may order
restitution not only for property loss but also for pain and suffering); Stephens, supra note
10, at 20 (discussing the low limits on compensation in criminal courts of the
Netherlands).
245. See Argentina Resp., at 19; Belgium Resp., at 50; Belgium Section of Composite
Supp. Resp.; France Resp., at 22; Japan Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Spain Section of
Composite Supp. Resp.; Stephens, supra note 10, at 19.
246. The action civile mechanism provides victims with an opportunity to piggyback
onto the investigatory and prosecutorial work of official prosecutors. See Stephens, supra
note 10, at 19. It can thus be a powerful tool, but only where a prosecutor is willing to
pursue a case with diligence. Id. at 20. On the other hand, if the prosecutor fails to devote
the necessary time and energy, a case is likely to fail or simply languish interminably, thus
defeating the victim's purposes. Id. Further, action civile systems suffer from certain additional disadvantages, such as limitations on the amounts of awards, vagaries of judicial
independence and the possibility, at least in France and Spain, that an unsuccessful partie
civile must pay the defendant's defense costs. See Spain Section of Composite Supp. Resp.;
Stephens, supra note 10, at 21.
247. Admittedly, the same could be said of criminal defendants generally.
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intentional tort or delict.2 48 The plaintiff's burden in a civil matter
is far easier to satisfy than the criminal "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard. Additionally, civil courts have jurisdiction over
legal persons even in judicial systems in which they are exempt
24 9
from criminal liability.

The Survey found that all of the Surveyed Countries have civil
250
tort systems whereby the victim of a wrong can sue for damages.
Indonesia's tort system is the most limited, since it allows civil
actions only for violations of environmental and consumer
protection.

25

1

The Survey disclosed several ICL-based actions filed by victims or
their representatives in the Surveyed Countries other than the
United States (under the ATCA). Those reported were found in
2 55 and Germany.2 56
Argentina, 25 2 Australia, 253 Belgium, 25 4 France,
A few tort actions involving victims of environmental violations or
248.

See generally TORTURE

AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-rVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT

(Craig Scott ed., 2001). See alsoJager&
van der Heijden, supra note 118, at 857 (discussing the tort laws of the Netherlands that
provide that breach of a statutory duty gives rise to a claim by the victim).
249. See, e.g., Argentina Resp., at 24.
250. See Argentina Resp., at 19, 21; Australia Resp., at 9; Belgian Resp., at 40, 41;
Canada Resp., at 5; France Resp., at 22; Germany Resp., at 16, 18, 22; India Resp., at 17, 21;
India Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Indonesia Resp., at 10;Japan Resp., at 22, 23, 26;
Netherlands Resp., at 19, 20, 22; Norway Resp., at 21, 22; South Africa Resp., at 20; Spain
Resp., at 11, 14, 15; Ukraine Resp., at 22, 23, 26; U.K. Resp., at 8, 9, 25; U.S. Resp., at 13.
251. See Indonesia Resp., at 14.
252. See Argentina Resp., at 16, 22 (discussing a civil tort action that was in progress
against employees of Ford Motor Argentina and Ford Motor Company for alleged complicity in crimes committed by state security forces in suppressing union activities at the company's car plants during the "dirty war" mentioned supra note 42). See also Business &
Human Rights: Ford in Argentina, http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/
Individualcompanies/F/Ford?&&&&&batchstart=51 (last visited July 23, 2009).
253. See Australia Resp., at 8 (mentioning a potential negligence claim that may be
filed against the Anvil Mining Company in connection with the events that are discussed
supra note 42).
254. See Belgium Resp., at 38. Two such Belgian suits were actions civiles brought
against the French oil company TotalFinaElf. Id. One was a suit by citizens of Myanmar
arising out of the construction of the same Yadana pipeline involved in the Unocal litigation. See id. The other involved war crimes allegedly committed by the Congolese President Sassou Nguesso. See id.
255. See France Resp., at 19 (citizens of Myanmar brought an action civilebefore French
courts against several high-ranking officials of TotalFinaElf S.A. and Total Myanmar Exploration Production for acts constituting the crime of illegal confinement arising out of the
defendant's involvement in the same pipeline project as figured in Unocal).
256. See Germany Resp., at 15 (describing the attempt by the U.S.-based Center for
Constitutional Rights to petition the attorney general to institute proceedings against Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense of the United States, and other high-ranking public
officials for their alleged involvement in the events at the Abu Ghraib prison; the attorney
general ultimately refused to file the case on the grounds that the matter was already
OF A TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
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violations of health and safety standards were reported in Austra2 60
and the United Kingdom, 261
lia, 257 Canada, 25 8 India, 259 Japan,

involving individual business representatives in some cases and corporate entities in others.
In contrast, plaintiffs have filed hundreds of tort actions-some
based on ICL and others alleging other breaches of noncriminal
aspects of international law-in the federal courts of the United
States under the ATCA-some based on ICL and others alleging
breaches of noncriminal aspects of international law-with the victims coming from over fifty foreign countries. 26 2 The U.S. federal
judicial system undoubtedly provides a relatively favorable environment for hearing complaints against business entities for aiding
and abetting grave human rights abuses, or, for that matter, for
263
tort litigation in general.
Beth Stephens, a law professor at Rutgers School of Law, has suggested that it is necessary to analyze the laws and customs of other
countries in order to understand how the kinds of human rights
accountability afforded by Filartiga"translate" in different jurisdictions. 264 The Survey provides important insights in this regard.
There are numerous advantages that tort plaintiffs in the United
involved in criminal proceeding in the United States and thus the principle of non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign state should prevail).
257. See Australia Resp., at 9 (mentioning a suit by natives of Papua, New Guinea,
against a mining company for environmental damages to their lands).
258. See Canada Resp., at 5 (describing a suit by residents of Ghana against a Quebec
company, dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, which alleged environmental harms
arising out of a mining operation in Ghana).
259. See India Resp., at 27 (describing a major action filed by residents of Bhopal,
India, against the Union Carbide Company for extensive injuries and loss of life arising
from the release of toxic gases from a chemical plant).
260. SeeJapan Resp., at 37 (describing an action wherein Indonesian plaintiffs sued a
consortium of Japanese companies and the Japanese government for failure to adhere to
international guidelines in planning and designing a large dam project in Sumatra that
involved the forcible displacement of as many as 23,000 people).
261. See U.K. Resp., at 27-28. One such case involved workers in the asbestos industry
suing their employers in English High Court. See id. at 27. Another concerned injuries
suffered in Namibian uranium mines. See id. A third was a negligence claim brought by
over two hundred Kenyans either killed or injured by weapons discarded by British troops
during military exercises in Kenya. See id.; see alsoJagers & van der Heijden, supra note 118
(discussing a civil case filed in London involving a cargo ship that was chartered by a corporation domiciled in the Netherlands to haul hazardous waste and eventually allegedly
ended up dumping in the streets of Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast, killing an
estimated 12 people and sickening over 9000).
262. Plaintiffs under ATCA have come from at least fifty-three countries. See infra
Appendix A.
263. See Stephens, supra note 10, at 17.
264. Id. at 35.
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States have over claimants elsewhere. The Survey sought to identify the obstacles that victims face in trying to find and access civil
courts in other countries. The responses identified the following:
(a) Absence
of class action rules or severe limitations on class
265
actions;
26 6
(b) Bans on contingency fees;
(c) "Loser pays" fee-shifting rules whereby the plaintiff2 runs
the
67
risk of having to pay a winning defendant's legal fees;
(d) Inadequate discovery

rules;

2 68

(e) Rules whereby the filing of a criminal complaint in a matter
2 69
will prevent or suspend the filing of a concurrent civil action;
(f) High
legal fees and costs, beyond the means of indigent
270
victims;

(g) Limitations on legal aid for indigent foreign plaintiffs;
27 2

271

(h) Lack of a culture encouraging pro bono services;

265. Class actions are generally prohibited in Argentina and the Netherlands. See
Argentina Resp., at 25;Jagers & van der Heijden, supra note 118, at 861 (discussing lack of
class action rules under Dutch law). In Australia, class actions of the "opt out" variety are
allowed only in federal and Victoria courts. Australia Resp., at 12. Class actions are provided for in the Spanish constitution, but courts are reluctant to apply the law. See Spain
Section of Composite Supp. Resp. Belgium allows members of a victim class to join in a
single action or to designate a representative to represent the class. Belgium Resp., at 81.
266. See Australia Resp., at 12; Belgium Resp., at 84; Jagers & van der Heijden, supra
note 118, at 860 (discussing absence of contingency fee arrangements in the Netherlands);
Spain Section of Composite Supp. Resp.
267. In Belgium, the United States, and Japan, parties generally bear their own costs
and expenses. In Australia, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Ukraine, and many
other countries, however, the loser pays all or a portion of the winner's fees and costs. See
Australia Resp., at 12; Belgium Resp., at 84; Germany Resp., at 25; Japan Resp., at 39 (in
civil tort cases, approximately 10% is added to the judgment to pay for a winning plaintiff's
legal fees); Jagers & van der Heijden, supra note 118, at 861 (discussing the fee shifting
laws of the Netherlands); Spain Section of Composite Supp. Resp.; Ukraine Resp., at 29.
268. See Belgium Resp., at 79 (judges have wide discretion to grant or withhold discovery of documents); Germany Resp., at 25 (plaintiffs have no rights to pre-trial discovery
except where they already have possession of excerpts of a document, in which case they
can demand to see the original.).
269. See Stephens, supra note 10, at 19.
270. See Argentina Resp., at 25; Australia Resp., at 12.
271. Some countries do not provide legal aid generally. See Australia Resp., at 12.
Others do not provide legal aid to foreign plaintiffs. Belgium has a program that provides
legal services for indigent citizens who seek to file civil suits and even actions civiles, and, in
cases where a treaty obligates it to do so, foreign indigents. See Belgium Resp., at 83. Germany also has a legal aid program for indigent civil plaintiffs. Germany Resp., at 26. Japan
allows for publicly funded legal aid, but not for foreign plaintiffs, with only a small number
of exceptions. Japan Resp., at 39. Additionally, Japanese fee scales for legal-aid attorneys
are quite low, not allowing sufficient funds for an expensive factual investigation, especially
where the events in question occurred abroad. Id. Norway has a legal aid program for
indigents that is available to foreign plaintiffs. Norway Resp., at 26.
272. Belgium allows for pro bono services. Belgium Resp., at 84. SeeJagers & van der
Heijden, supra note 118, at 860 (discussing how in the Netherlands, the legal culture does
not promote the use of volunteer services to the same degree as in the United States).
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(i) Inability to recover for pain and suffering,
other forms of
273
consequential damages, or punitive damages;
(j) Inability to recover for wrongful death of a relative; 274 and
(k) Standing
requirements that prohibit public interest
2 75
lawsuits.

The Survey indicated various other obstacles inhibiting victims'
lawsuits, obstacles which are also present to some degree in the
United States but have even greater negative impacts in other
countries. These include:
276
(1) Short statutes of limitations;
277
(m) High court fees payable in advance;
(n) High costs and other barriers
associated with requirements
278
to use only local languages;
(o) Extreme slowness of civil courts, especially involving civil
279
appeal;
(p) Lack of court jurisdiction over governmental
agencies,
280
heads of state, and state-owned enterprises;
(q) Courts' lack of authority to entertain lawsuits over events
28 1
occurring abroad;
282
(r) Application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens;,

273. In Germany, damages for pain and suffering are far lower than in the United
States. Germany Resp., at 26. The Netherlands does not allow courts to award punitive
damages. Jagers & van der Heijden, supra note 118, at 861.
274. In Argentina, a dependant can sue in tort, but only if the victim dies after the suit
was filed. Argentina Resp., at 25. In Germany, a dependant can recover for wrongful
death only if the dependant also suffered damages. Germany Resp., at 26.
275. Argentina Resp., at 25; Belgium Resp., at 80. In Belgium, recent legislation was
enacted that gave environmental groups the right to bring lawsuits on environmental
issues in which they have an interest, thereby overcoming some standing issues. Belgium
Resp., at 83; cf Jager & van der Heijden, supra note 118, at 7 (discussing Dutch standing
requirements that allow an NGO to bring a lawsuit where the harm occurs to a general
interest it is promoting).
276. See Argentine Resp., at 24; Germany Resp., at 26 (an absolute limit of 30 years,
without possibility of tolling); India Resp., at 22; U.K. Resp., at 31.
277. See Germany Resp., at 26; India Resp., at 22; Japan Resp., at 39 (although indigent
plaintiffs can defer payment until after judgment); Norway Resp., at 26 (requirement for
foreign plaintiffs only).
278. SeeJapan Resp., at 39.
279. See India Resp., at 23; Ukraine Resp., at 29.
280. See Argentina Resp., at 25; Belgium Resp., at 41.
281. See Belgium Resp., at 80; Germany Resp., at 23; India Resp., at 22. But seeAustralia
Resp., at 10 (discussing a case in which an Australian court allowed a suit involving an
automobile accident occurring in a foreign country on the grounds that the victim had
sought medical care in Australia, thus stretching the "direct effect" rule).
282. See Argentina Resp., at 25; Canada Resp., at 5; India Resp., at 23; Indonesia Resp.,
at 15 (observing that the single Indonesian decision applying the doctrine has been
"strongly criticized");Japan Resp., at 28; U.K Resp., at 32; U.S. Resp., at 18. The doctrine
is not followed in many of the Surveyed Countries. See Australia Resp., at 12; Belgium
Resp., at 85 (discussing a recent Belgian statute that authorizes judges to accept jurisdiction over tort actions arising in foreign countries where proceedings abroad would be
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(s) Lack of jurisdiction over foreign-based defendants,
espe2 83
cially foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations;
(t) Difficulty of collecting on judgments,
including nonrecogni2 84
tion of judgments by foreign courts;
28 5
(u) Complex and unpredictable choice of laws rules;
(v) Lack of cooperation by foreign police forces; 2 86 and
(w) Inadequacy of witness protection
programs and confidenti28 7
ality of witnesses in civil tort trials.

Experience under ATCA suggests rather convincingly that victims who are unable to find a forum in their home countries due to
the presence of these obstacles are willing to travel great distances,
at great risk and expense, in order to seek justice in the United
States. 288 Those who have endured great suffering are not princi289
pally motivated to sue only because they want compensation.
They also have an understandable desire for retribution and a
impossible or where it would be unreasonable to request that the case be brought in a
foreign court.); France Resp., at 29; Netherlands Resp., at 26; Spain Resp., at 15.
283. With few exceptions, plaintiffs/victims may only reach an ICL offender for conduct occurring abroad, whether individual or a corporation, in the country where the individual or corporation is a resident. See, e.g.,
Argentina Resp., at 22; Australia Resp., at 10;
Canada Resp., at 6 (must have a "real and substantial connection" with the subject of the
litigation.); Belgium Resp., at 65; Japan Resp., at 27. In the case of a corporation, "residence" consists of having a headquarters office or a principal branch office. See, e.g.,
Belgium Resp., at 65, Netherlands Resp., at 24. The difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over
a corporate defendant may be compounded by the corporate form of the defendant.
Where the actual perpetrator is a different affiliated corporation, even a wholly-owned
subsidiary, jurisdictional rules may preclude a suit against the parent or domestic affiliate
even in the home country where the parent or domestic affiliate has its headquarters. See,
e.g., South Africa Resp., at 26. Some of the respondents to the Survey stated that it is
sometimes possible to bring an action against a parent for its own conduct in causing the
subsidiary to commit a violation. See Australia Resp., at 11; France Resp., at 6. Some countries reported that a corporation that commits a tort in their jurisdictions may by that very
act subject itself to the civil jurisdiction of that country's courts. See Argentina Resp., at 21;
Germany Resp., at 23.
284. See Ukraine Resp., at 29.
285. See U.K. Resp., at 31.
286. See France Resp., at 29 (referring to the context of the action civile).
287. SeeJapan Resp., at 40 (a "certain measure of protection was established by a new
act in 2007 and will enter into force during this year, though the effect and the practice of
such protection remain to be seen");Japan Section of Composite Supp. Resp.
288. Courts handling ATCA cases are frequently required to assess the likelihood of
plaintiffs obtaining justice in their home countries when ruling on motions to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 2d 289, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (providing a thoughtful description of the situation
in Sudan at the time).
289. See Steinhardt, supra note 3, at 25 ("On the other hand, [ATCA/TVPA] plaintiffs
are rarely if ever motivated by the prospect of making money out of their ordeals, finding
vindication in the imposition of individual responsibility and the supremacy of principle
over skepticism.").
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deeply held need to tell their story290 so as to expose their oppressors. 29 1 It is critically important to them to have a judge or some
other public authority accept and announce the truth so that they
can see that justice is done.29 2 The record under ATCA shows an
extremely low success rate of plaintiffs against corporate defendants, but, nonetheless, the stream of filings goes on. The ATCA
experience teaches us that victims of horrendous international
crimes will pursue justice even if their governments seem oblivious
to their own responsibilities to do so.
Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie acknowledged the
need for foreign countries to open their courts to victims of international crimes when he told the Canadian Bar Association in 2008
that the Canadian legislature should consider adopting legislation
that would allow foreign victims to sue corporations in Canadian
courts for ICL violations committed abroad. 29 3 He pointed out
that Canada is among a large group of countries that are parties to
international agreements that recognize human rights but have
not yet provided accessible forums to hear the victims' complaints. 29 4 Justice Binnie observed that "if [the ATCA] were replicated in more countries, there would be more avenues whereby
companies could clear their names of allegations made against
them, or complainants could obtain redress, depending on what
29 5
the evidence shows."
290. See Erin Stapp, Third-PartyLiability for Violations of the Law of Nations: Apply International Law, The Law of the Situs, or Domestic Standards?, 49 SANTA CtARA L. REv. 495, 499
(2009) (discussing victims' needs "to create a judicial record of their suffering").
291. See Cherif Bassiouni, The Role of Justice in Building Peace: Justice and Peace: The
Importance Of ChoosingAccountability Over Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 191 (2003)
(telling the story of a man in Bosnia who reported terrible savagery to the UN Commission
of Experts to Investigate the War Crimes and Other Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, only to commit suicide that same evening, leaving the
message: "I lived long enough to tell my story to someone in the hope that it will be told in
the future.").
292. See Francisco Rivera, Inter-AmericanJustice: Now Available in a U.S. Federal Court Near
You, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 889, 897 (2005) (relating how Dolly Filrtiga, sister of the
decedent in the Fildrtiga case, described her feelings about the outcome of the case, even
though Pefia-Irala, the defendant, had fled to avoid paying the $10 million judgment:
"With the help of American law I was able to fight back and win. Truth overcame terror.
Respect for human rights triumphed over torture. What better purpose can be served by a
system ofjustice?"). For a discussion of the importance of trials in situations of mass atrocity, see MARK OISEL, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law (1999).
293. See Cristin Schmitz, Binnie Callsfor CorporateAccountability, LAWyERs WKLv., Aug. 29,
2008, available at http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=745.
294. See id.
295.

Id.

20091

Liability of Business Entities for International Crimes

Those who wish to advance the cause of opening the civil courts
to victims of ICL violations would do well to seek allies among
advocates of tort reform on behalf of victims of other illicit practices. These could include victims of consumer fraud, environmental harms, product defects, medical malpractice, and food
impurities. A recent example of the effort to open the courts to
victims occurred in China, where the parents of children sickened
or killed by tainted milk filed a class action against the twenty-two
dairy companies that sold it.296 As the demands for corporate
accountability for human rights and other abuses mount, countries
are likely to face increasing pressure to open their courts.
The success of the international covenants discussed earlier in
causing countries to incorporate international crimes suggests that
policymakers might be led to consider undertaking multilateral,
normative standard setting, such as in an international covenant.
This could significantly add to the web of liability and thus ensure
greater accountability. As mentioned earlier, a current example of
a successful effort to use an international covenant to open up
legal avenues for victims to recover damages is found in UNCAC,
which requires all of its parties to provide legal means whereby vic29 7
tims of corruption can sue those responsible in domestic forums.
The results of the Survey suggest that improved access to civil justice in domestic courts could ultimately provide the most effective
means of redress for victims of ICL violations.
CONCLUSION

The Survey results show that the fundamental legal concept
embraced by Unocal-corporate accountability for complicity in
human rights abuses-is being "translated" into the legal traditions
of many countries, thus forming a web of liability for businesses
implicated in international crimes. The basic vehicle for the
"translation" phenomenon has been widespread action by countries to bring their domestic legal regimes into line with their obligations under the Rome Statute and other international covenants.
When ICL is incorporated into a domestic legal system, it interacts with preexisting laws. In all of the Surveyed Countries, ICL
assumes the extraterritorial jurisdiction of other domestic crimes,
including universal jurisdiction that potentially applies to any ICL
violation anyplace in the world. ICL also participates in the appli296. See Edward Wong, Families File Suit in Chinese Tainted Milk Scandal, N.Y. TiMES, Jan.
21, 2009, at A19.
297. UNCAC, supra note 189, art. 35.
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cation of domestic third-party-liability concepts, and it becomes
applicable to corporations in countries where other criminal statutes apply, thereby filling a gap in the ICC's core jurisdiction. In
all countries, ICL provides a basis for potential civil liability for
every offender, including legal persons.
The applicability of incorporated ICL to legal persons in an
increasing number of domestic jurisdictions creates the need for
transnational business corporations themselves to reckon with the
expanding web of liability. In the particular legal tradition and culture of the United States, the need for accountability for ICL violations has translated primarily into civil litigation. In other
countries, the need for accountability may translate into criminal
prosecutions or administrative processes instead of civil litigation,
or else into hybrid remedies, such as the action civile. Although ICL
is largely untested in many domestic courts, it has the potential to
ensnare corporations and their representatives who become
involved in international crimes, whether deliberately or else inadvertently through what might otherwise appear to be normal business activities or relationships. This potential is exponentially
higher when transnational corporations do business with authorities or nonstate groups in conflict zones and repressive regimessituations where ICL violations are often widespread.
The web of liability will likely continue to expand as more countries join the ICC and complete the process of incorporating its
core crimes. Undoubtedly, the meaning of concepts like the test
for the mens rea of aiding and abetting an international crime and
the reach of various aspects of the JCE concept will become clearer
as, in the course of time, domestic courts are called upon to apply
and interpret ICL in a domestic context. Meanwhile, many countries already have a body of other domestic crimes on their books.
These are crimes outside the jurisdiction of the ICC, such as bribery of public officials, money laundering, and dealing in stolen
property, which apply extraterritorially to the conduct of a country's nationals, including corporations, that do business abroad.
Although individual business representatives have been convicted of ICL violations, no business corporation has yet been convicted of a direct or indirect violation of ICL in a domestic criminal
court. This may be due to the fact that prosecutors, despite their
ample authority in many countries to charge domestic corporations with direct or indirect ICL violations committed abroad, have
had difficulty overcoming some of the barriers discussed earlier in
this Article. Prosecutorial exercise of universal jurisdiction is
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almost unheard of outside of a few European countries, such as
Belgium, France, and Spain.
The Survey identified a few legal mechanisms available to victims
that allow them to intervene in prosecutorial decisions, thereby offsetting official reluctance to file these cases. But for the most part,
prosecutorial discretion is the rule. In the few cases against individual business representatives that have moved forward, it has
often been at the urging of national and international human
rights organizations. This indicates that human rights organizations will need to continue to play a central role in informing
domestic prosecutors of their authority, assisting in the gathering
of evidence, and otherwise advocating for greater prosecution of
international crimes.
Finally, the Survey found that all of the Surveyed Countries have
civil delict or tort-like systems that would, at least in theory, provide
victims of ICL violations with a cause of action against their abusers. The Survey, however, also identified numerous obstacles to
such lawsuits. Courthouse doors are, for both legal and practical
reasons, generally closed to victims, particularly those who live in
poverty. This is due to factors such as restrictions on contingency
fees, lack of class action rules, bans on the delivery of pro bono legal
services, and the prevalence of a "loser pays" practice regarding
legal fees and costs. Thus, civil lawsuits-even for the most heinous international crimes-are either simply unavailable or, if
available, prohibitively expensive, financially risky, or both.
These obstacles remain in place owing to attitudes deeply rooted
in the legal cultures of many countries. Yet nowhere does the law
remain entirely static. For example, whereas criminal liability of
legal persons was once generally held to be unacceptable in many
countries, an increasing number of countries now fully accept it.298
Class actions are no longer an exclusively U.S. phenomenon. 29 9
Courthouse doors are slowly opening throughout the world. Even
in Indonesia, which does not generally recognize tort actions, the
legislature has recently provided that individuals harmed by envi298. See Belgium Resp., at 6 (law creating corporate criminal liability was enacted in
1999); France Resp., at 4 (new Criminal Code provision applying criminal liability to legal
persons was enacted in 2001).
299. whether the class action against the dairy companies mentioned earlier will be
allowed to stand remains to be seen. But other jurisdictions are opening to class actions.
Some Australian jurisdictions allow class actions. Australia Resp., at 12. In France, the
Sarkozy government is backing a proposed bill that would authorize class actions. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization,Legal Transnationalizationand Crimes Against Humanity:
The Lipietz Case, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 363, 399 n.192 (2008).
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ronmental violations or consumer safety violations can bring lawsuits for damages. 3 0 0 These indications suggest that governments
worldwide are susceptible to public pressure to remove those
obstacles.
In the meantime, the list of grave obstacles to civil justice that
emerges from the Survey suggests an urgent agenda for legal
reform.3 0 1 In the pursuit of the twin objectives of ending impunity
and obtaining greater clarity in the regulation of business practices
abroad, business groups and human rights organizations alike
would do well to participate in this agenda as a critical part of the
"translation" process.

300. Indonesia Resp., at 14.
301. See Collingworth, supra note 179, at 203 ("Until human rights are given the same
priority as property rights, incidents of torture, murder, kidnapping and sexual assault will
continue to be shocking, but routine, consequences of a lawless global economy.")
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APPENDIX

1

COUNTRY
Afghanistan

2

Algeria

3

Argentina
Argentina
Argentina

4

Austria

5

Belgium

6

Bosnia
Bosnia

7

Chile
Chile
Chile
Chile
Chile
Chile

8

China
China
China
China
China

9

Colombia
Colombia
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A

CASE
In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F.
Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007)
Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115
(D.D.C. 2003)
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992)
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal.
1987)
Bauman v. DaimlerChryslerAG, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13116 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007)
Anderman v. Fed. Republic of Austria, 256 F. Supp.
2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424
(D.N.J. 1999)
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)
Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D.
Ga. 2002)
Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir.
2006)
Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C.
2004)
Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp.
2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
Barrueto v. Larios, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla.
2003)
Bauman v. DaimlerChryslerAG, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13116 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007)
Denegri v. Republic of Chile, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4233 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 1992)
Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004)
Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000)
Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.
2003)
Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10834
(D.D.C. July 9, 1999)
Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp.
2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D.
Fla. Miami Div. 2006)
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Colombia
10

Czechoslovakia

11

Ecuador
Ecuador
12 Egypt
13 El Salvador
El Salvador
El Salvador
14
15

Ethiopia
France
France

16

Germany
Germany

17

Ghana

18

Guatamala
Guatamala

19

20

Haiti
Haiti
Haiti
Hungary
Hungary

21

India

22

Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
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Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp, 381 F. Supp.
2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248
(D.NJ. 1999)
Jota v. Texaco Corp., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998)
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002)
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000)
Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254 (lth Cir. 2006)
Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D.
Cal. 2004)
Chavez v. Carranza, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63257
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2006)
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (lth Cir. 1996)
Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117
(E.D.N.Y. 2000)
Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer
Francais, 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003)
Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132 (E.D.N.Y.
2004)
Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27693 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2003)
Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc. 416
F.3d 1242 (l1th Cir. 2005)
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass.
1995)
jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776 (lth Cir. 2005)
Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y.
1994)
Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.
2003)
Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D.
Fla. 2002)
Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.
2001)
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. La. 1997)
Doe v Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20
(D.D.C. 2005)
Alomang v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15908 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1996)
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Iraq
Iraq

24

Israel
Israel
Israel

25

Kenya
Kenya
Kenya

26
27

Lebanon
Liberia

28
29

Libya
Malaysia

30
31

Mexico
Myanmar

32

New Guinea

33

Nicaragua
Nicaragua

34

Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria

35
36

Palestine
Panama
Panama

Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C.
2006)
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C.
2005)
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984)
Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257
(E.D.N.Y. 2007)
Saperstein v. Palestinian Auth., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92778 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2006)
Mwani v. Bin Ladin, 244 F.R.D. 20 (D.D.C. 2007)
Abur v. Republic of Sudan, 437 F. Supp. 2d 166
(D.D.C. 2005)
Mwani v. Bin Ladin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27826
(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2002)
Belhas v. Ya'Alon, 466 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C 2006)
Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D.
Ind. 2007)
Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y.
2002)
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)
Doe I v. Unocal Corp, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D.
Cal. 2000)
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.
2007)
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985)
Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452
(S.D. Fla. 1990)
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 2000)
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp.
2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
Abiola v. Abubakar, 435 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill.
2006)
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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B

Argentina

Following the rescission in 2003 of the blanket amnesty
that was granted for all crimes committed during the
"dirty war" period from 1976 to 1983 (see supra note
42), authorities took action against employees of Ford
Motor Company for their complicity in the disappearance of labor activists working at a company plant.
Argentina Resp., at 15, 17.

Australia

The federal police are investigating whether Anvil Mining Ltd. is complicit in crimes against humanity committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Australia Resp., at 11.
Authorities investigated a case involving crimes against
humanity in 1998. Other criminal matters reported
involved the use of the action civile mechanism: a case
against TotalFinaElf S.A. for its alleged involvement in
the same atrocities that figured in the Unocal litigation.
In 2003, action civile complaints were lodged against
high-profile political leaders in the United States and
Israel, leading the legislature to make changes in the
action civile statute that effectively placed control over
suits against foreign defendants in the hands of the
National Prosecutor. Belgium Resp., at 34, 38, 55, 60.

Belgium

Canada

In 2009, D~sire6 Munyaneza, a Hutu, was convicted in a
Montreal court of crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide relating to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Ian
Austen, Rwandan Is Convicted in Genocide, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2009, at A8.

France

Authorities brought charges of genocide and crimes
against humanity arising out of events in Rwanda in
1994. France Resp., at 19, 26. The action civile mechanism has been used by Myanmar citizens to bring
charges against officials of TotalFinaElf S.A. in connection with events arising out of the pipeline project
involved in the Unocal matter, as discussed in note 200.
France Resp., at 19.
Frans van Anraat was convicted of complicity in war
crimes and ultimately received a nineteen-year sentence.
Netherlands Resp., at 14. Van Anraat, Rechtsbank
[Rb.] Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague], 23
December 2005, UN AU8685 (Neth.). See also Wilt,
supra note 121. Guus Van Kouwenhoven was charged
with complicity in war crimes in Liberia and Sierra
Leone and also for violating a U.N.-imposed arms
embargo for selling weapons to Charles Taylor. Netherlands Resp., at 14. Although he was found guilty of violating the arms embargo, the guilty verdict was
overturned on appeal. The attempted prosecution of

The Netherlands
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Spain

United States
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Desi Bourtese, the former head of Surinam, for torture
and murder occurring in 1982 (prior to the adoption
of ICL legislation in the Netherlands) failed when the
court dismissed the prosecution on the grounds that
ICL is not enforceable until it has been incorporated
into the penal code. Netherlands Resp., at 17.
In 1998, Judge Baltazar Garc6n, who had initiated the
original Spanish prosecution of former Chilean dictator
Agusto Pinochet, investigated acts of genocide and terrorism in Argentina (concurrently with his investigation
of similar matters in Chile). See Maria del Carmen Mirquez Carrasco & Joaquin Alcaide Ferndndez, In re
Pinochet, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 690 (1999). In 2005, Judge
Garc6n investigated instances of genocide in Guatemala. Spain Resp., at 14. There is also an effort underway to assert Spanish universal jurisdiction over mass
murders committed in El Salvador. See Victoria Burnett,
Jesuit Killings in El Salvador Could Reach Trial in Spain,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at A1O.
Charles "Chuckie" Taylor, Jr., the son of Charles Taylor,
the former Liberian president, was sentenced to ninetyseven years in prison on January 9, 2009. Son of Ex-President of Liberia Gets 97-Year Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2009, at A14. Chuckie Taylor headed a
paramilitary unit during his father's presidency. See also
Elise Keppler, Shirley Jean & J. Paxton Marshall, First
Prosecution in the United States for Torture Committed
Abroad: The Trial of Charles 'Chuckie' Taylor, Jr., 15 HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 17 (2008).

